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 A ghost is wandering through Romania, 
 it is the ghost of reform…    
  
– ABSTRACT –  
 
The purpose of politics in a democratic society is to draft, endorse, and back public 
political life. Political life in Romania during the first decade of transition was very complex and 
dynamic. Even accounting for these obstacles, governance in Romania clearly fell short of its 
potential, mainly in finalizing reform policies. This poor governance impacts both the current 
socio-economic situation, and Romania’s ability to excel in regional competition. Foreign 
investors’ interest remained low, along with effectiveness in accessing Euro-Atlantic structures. 
One can say that the contradictory developments of the socio-political relations have 
lately generated a genuine historical obstacle, in relation to the post-communist countries from 
Central Europe. At domestic level poverty, corruption, and a situation of administrative disorder 
have accumulated.  
Romania is a “chaotic democracy”. Through free elections, all relevant political forces 
have enjoyed full access to power structures.  Yet they have failed to profit from the 
opportunities democracy offers for modernization, economic revival and social welfare, 
regardless of their political orientation. 
Meanwhile, the Romanian political environment has consumed the preliminary 
enthusiasm generated after the release of totalitarianism. Public expectations have been 
disappointed and have declined, in an endless succession of internal crises, hesitating 
approaches, and spectacular but useless upturns, without achieving good governance. Indeed, 
bad governance has cursed the Romanian state throughout this whole century, irrespective of the 
political systems and regimes that have imposed themselves.  
Romanian society faces a genuine deadlock at the onset of the millennium. Romania 
retains a harmful mixture of economic and social structures, of old fashioned practices and 
mentalities, of hazardous circumstances and options. These forces threaten Romania’s natural 
and human resources, and prevent the realization of its historical potential.  
Consequently, Romania suffers an increasing discordance between its regional activities, 
the needs and expectations of its population, and the effectiveness of the institutions it has built 
since the fall of totalitarian communism. This disequilibrium has branded Romania with 
helplessness and lack of cohesion. Besides wasting time, this inertia threatens Romania with 
marginalization, leaving its internal evolution isolated from the constraints and opportunities 
posed by the free world. An unprecedented historical opportunity is about to become a failure.  
Can we distill enough positive energy from this experience enough to revive the 
transition in Romania? 
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 Are we better able to determine necessary measures both for the present and the 
foreseeable future? Will Romania still remain paralyzed by its unique condition?  
It remains to be seen, but it is obvious that the allotted time is very short. In fact, we are 
at a crossroads. The Romanians can go back to the traditional obedience of living “as prisoners 
of the circumstances.” Or conversely, they can overcome the traps of the past decade, achieving 
through political will and consistent public effort a strategic shift to modernization. 
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 1. Obstacles at the Start  
1.1. Negative Efficiency of Absent Structures  
Romania initiated transition with less favorable conditions than those experienced in 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. 
The December 1989 Revolution succeeded in liquidating, almost at once, the institutional 
structures of totalitarian communism. During the previous two decades these structures had 
expanded their activities in line with the neo-Stalinist dictatorship. As a socio-political 
phenomenon, the Romanian revolution did achieve a radical break from genuine socialism. 
The transition toward democratization, and the reconstruction of the free market, 
commenced however in the absence of the essential premises of Western-type modernization. 
Modern structures were presumed to exist both at the level of public debate and at the level of 
national institutions, where political pacts and social agreements worked to establish the new 
modus vivandi. In fact, the Romanian society committed itself to the modernization race with an 
essential handicap, one that was difficult to overcome in a short period of time.  
The new political structures—provisory ones at the national level as well as local ones—
and the new economic and social policies emerged and operated based on the presumed 
existence of three groups of factors: 
• Pro-capitalist public elite; 
• Population eager to prosper under circumstances of competitiveness, decentralization, 
and steady effort; 
• Economic environment open to new forms of organization, management and 
settlement in accordance with free market conditions. 
Were these factors in place, the reform, as a strategic process, would have meant 
transformation through consistently supported stages. This would have ensured positive results 
accessible to the great majority of the population, achieved through the finalization of projects, 
through the re-assertion and operation of local communities. In fact, however, discrepancies 
between the ideal case and the actual circumstances have entailed, from the very start, a halving 
of the civil discourse. They have produced some political progress, both courageous and 
vulnerable in light of initial obstacles, but the great majority of these new institutions, initiatives, 
and actions work against modernization.  
The absence of these elements at the outset of transition has allowed for the emergence of 
certain trends hostile to reform. Efforts at change have been diverted, undermined, and blocked. 
The missing elements of reform, and the adverse activities that this situation permitted, eclipsed 
the positive movements in its influence over post-revolutionary options, expectations and hopes. 
Consequently: 
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 1.1.1 The post-communist political class called to initiate and back the policies of 
reform has manifested itself as a heterogeneous mixture, a critical non-liberal mass, dependent 
on the state regime or stuck in nostalgia for inter-war Romania. The public Administration, 
inherited from the former regime, was frightened at first and subordinated itself during the first 
steps toward reform. Quite soon, however, the bureaucracy in the ministries and the managers 
from the state companies recovered their influence over some important economic and social 
balance levers. They have now ensconced themselves as durable obstacles to reform. 
1.1.2 The great majority of Romania’s population, particularly the active population, 
lacks the reflexes of a healthy civil society, autonomous in exercising its freedom of speech, 
association, and initiative. Rather, the dominant patterns of individual and collective behavior 
revert to egalitarianism, and the paternalist protection of the state. The society has almost no 
experience with free initiative, communitarian association, or civic exigency toward political 
leaders upon which to call. Society has responded timidly to the radical changes brought by the 
separation from communism, and to the risks involved in open structures, competition, and 
differentiation. This fear has manifested itself in affinity for a wide range of popular actions 
(socialist, nationalistic, mercantile). The rediscovery of the value of money and the market, and 
the competitive appraisal of the enterprises inherited from the socialist regime, took place in an 
ambiguous climate, one without convincing landmarks and accessible opportunities.  
Moreover, the collapse of the socialist economy has fully exposed the scope of the social 
crisis, and has made more attractive solutions that simply delay consequences. The threat of 
unemployment, of inflation, and of rapid social differentiation, has become part of daily 
experience for a population that is already exhausted by the megalomaniacal policies of the 
former dictatorship. Consequently, individuals are drawn to a gradual approach, one which will 
postpone as much as possible confrontation with a reality that had remained under the influence 
of dogmas for more than a decade. In fact there have never been more favorable conditions for 
the success of the anti-capitalist propaganda that had emerged in the previous decades. 
The rapid erosion of public support for structural change, the preference for the 
“Gorbatchov pattern” for restructuring Eastern Europe, seem today to be unavoidable trends, 
very consistent with the first years of public life in Romania.  
1.1.3 The Romanian economic environment, ruined by the bankruptcy of the state 
planning system, also completely lacked the minimal structures of the profitable private 
competition. In agriculture, in the small industry and in the service sector, small property had 
disappeared almost completely, along with private companies and alternative methods of 
thinking and public communication.  
Opportunity has remained for quite some time the privilege of certain groups directly 
linked to the political process. Access to opportunity was simply transferred from the state 
monopoly to the oligarchies currently being established. 
The middle class, so often invoked in public debates, has remained an absent character. 
Though a great deal of the legislative initiatives and facilities were initiated in its name, this 
proved to be a mere formal exercise, an apparent ritual, supported mainly for its value to 
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 Romania’s image abroad. The privatization processes, started soon after the May 1990 elections, 
did not have a domestic commercial class capable of leading Romanian industry to profit.  
And as regards the foreign partnership, why did the slogan “We do not sell our country!” 
come out so soon and see such effect?  
The historical wind of opportunity, opened by the December 1989 Revolution, 
completely lacked a genuine perspective. The reform has begun as a game in a virtual space, 
spectacular in the development of political life, but modest in genuine structural developments in 
the economic field.  
 
1.2. The Fields of Public Life and the Temptation of Labyrinth 
If we take into consideration the historical peculiarity of the processes of transition in 
Romania—the deficiencies it faced in its initiation—we can see more clearly the evolution of 
political dynamics and governance during reform.  
First of all we must take into account the simultaneity of some domestic processes, 
specific to the first years following the fall of the totalitarian communism. Within the political 
environment, democratization favors the institutional reconstruction effort and a massive 
amplification of the ongoing political life. At the same time, the first changes in the economic 
and social life result in an exponential multiplication and diversification of problems and trends. 
The responsibility for solving these new problems places an unprecedented pressure on 
authorities. The economic crisis of the socialist economy, now freed from the control of 
authoritarian state policy, exacerbate this situation.  
Soon after the moments of general euphoria that followed the release from the 
dictatorship, the new democratic structures, still fragile, incomplete, and lacking the expertise or 
the management methods of an open society, had to choose between their own consolidation—
assuring a new social balance, focusing on the economic agenda—or the initiation of structural 
changes. This choice is very difficult to make, and it is the first determination of whether 
transition will proceed by a reforming governance or by the establishment, with preference for 
stability at the price of stagnation.  
This historical trap is related to the content of transition itself, and the East-European 
experience of the first ten years offers a great variety of situations and solutions.  
To shift focus to the exigencies of political and social factors on one hand, or to the 
requirements and rules of the developing free market on the other hand, expresses the essence of 
the overall evolution of the course of public life. It can mainly be seen in the evolution of the 
post-communist society toward the modern capitalism system.  
The negative effect of this trap, which becomes a dominant phenomenon, comprises 
precisely in forcing a choice between political factors and the initial function of drafting and 
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 backing reform policies, between “politics” and “policies”**. The emphasis on politics, at the 
expense of effective policy, becomes the main obstacle to economic reform, and distorts the 
other processes of change (decentralization, community development, selective and stimulative 
social protection).  
 The fields of the public life are to be seen exactly between these two axes of the public 
life: politics vs. policies:  
0.0.
0.1.
“Policies” 
“PolItics”
1.0.
1.1.
This situation (0.0.) describes in fact the order previous to the authoritarian state policy, 
where both the political factors of the pluralist democratic system and the economic policies 
specific to the market economy are equally missing. As it has been said before, Romania’s case 
represents an outstanding example of the near past, totally hostile and opposite modern 
capitalism, which was characterized by the sole party system and that of the state-communist 
management. 
As a pattern for the interval (0.1.) it characterizes the first stage of democratization in 
which, under the circumstances of the fall of the dictatorship and the disappearance of its main 
institutional structures, political parties, free media, free trade unions, non-governmental 
associations emerge and develop at a steady pace. The public debate reaches high levels, 
convulsive confrontations and developments deepen the separation from the old system, and a 
new public life expands and diversifies. Some decisions and packages of steps target economic 
structures. However, they do not establish policies for reform itself, but rather their main goal is 
to stop some severe malfunctions in the management of a socialist economy in deep crisis and 
the assurance of a social preliminary balance for a population that had been subjected to 
shortcomings and constraints for years on end. An important component that emerges gradually 
and prepares the field for new economic policies is aiming exactly at the institutional 
reconstruction and the legislative framework of the mechanisms for drafting, supporting and 
finalizing the reform policies.  
This pattern (1.1.) defines the maximal variant of the reforming approach, where the 
political factors have established themselves as a whole, already benefit from a democratic 
governance and support a high functionality of the mechanisms for drafting policies oriented 
toward the establishment and support of a free market, and of the Euro-Atlantic integration. This 
pattern describes the regime of governance through reform. Both the legitimacy of the power and 
public support are balanced and define their “state reason” by creating efficient policies in 
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* The Romanian language, but mainly the dominant political mentalities fail to make the necessary distinction among "Politics" 
and "Policy"! 
 backing up structural changes, assurances of the macro-economic balance, revival of domestic 
and foreign competitiveness as new resources for social stability and attractiveness toward 
foreign investments and international cooperation. 
The post-transition pattern (1.0.) describes the perspective once the main “critical 
thresholds” are overcome. These thresholds are the main milestones in developing the role of 
economic restructuring and in assuring the balance of the social structures and of the labor 
market. Modernization policies are increasingly drafted and supported through the market 
mechanisms, communitarian development, civic participation and international cooperation. 
Political actors keep their importance mainly as regulating mechanisms: they protect, encourage, 
and stimulate the development of a public and economic life that has meanwhile recovered its 
consistency, structural properties and its own dynamics. The mission of reform as a strategic 
process would come to an end, the post-communist society would make room for a new status 
quo, specific to the free world.  
All these patterns define distinct stages of the transition and constitute themselves in a 
reference index of its dynamics. The polarity between the predominance of the politics and the 
development of the market economy is therefore an intrinsic characteristic of the transition 
process. Their antinomy, the tension and even the conflict between the trends, through which 
they manifest themselves, clearly shows their deviation from a reasonable trajectory. The 
experience gained in the first ten years highlights a series of “routes” that helped to focus the 
political factors or the reform policies. This has often taken place in an oscillating manner, with 
recapitulation and deadlock along these fields of transition. A labyrinth-type behavior is the 
characteristic of the Romanian transition.  
This makes the way longer, more expensive and, worst, permanently lacking in 
perspective. “The light at the end of the tunnel” has become an institutional cliché exactly owing 
to this excessive complication of the transition routes.  
1.2.1. This trajectory (A) describes the successful evolution from the state property type 
of real socialism to a state of balance and efficiency in the relations between the new democracy 
and management through reform.  
0.0. 
0.1. 
“Policies” 
“Politics” 
1.0. 
1.1. 
A 
A’ 
(A’) : The road was shorter and less complicated: there the effective existence of some 
alternative structures at political, economic, and communitarian levels have survived, co-existed 
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 or even played an active role before the fall of the system (Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary). 
1.2.2. This describes the full evolution of the post-communist societies in relation to the 
post-transition perspective (B) and it highlights the fact that “breaking up from the reform” will 
most certainly include specific sizes and “critical thresholds” and not only an ordinary approach. 
B
B’
0.0. 
0.1. 
“Policies” 
“Politics”
1.0.
1.1.
 
“Access to the future” through integration in Euro-Atlantic structures and the 
maintenance of foreign markets will bring new topics and targets for the societies that have 
succeeded in reaching the parameters of reform for the system.  
Conversely, stagnation in reaching this threshold makes possible other trajectories, and 
distorts the perspectives on evolution, extending too much the emancipation efforts at national 
level, increasing social and material costs for access to modernization.  
Here are some of the “entrances to the labyrinth” that the Romanian experience has tried 
with a stubbornness worthy of better causes.  
1.2.3. This describes the sinuous evolution of Romanian politics (C) in the first interval 
of democratization, when progress in assessing some democratic bodies have been marked by  
convulsive developments, non-democratic practices, and retaliation trends. 
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 C 
0.0. 
0.1. 
“Policies” 
“Politics” 
1.0.
1.1.
 . 
“The University Square Crisis” in June 1990 and “The Miners’ Incursion” in September 
1991, have highlighted, in different ways, the barriers that remain in the public sphere during the 
process of complete separation from the authoritarian system.  
The maintenance of these discrepancies and internal divisions both in the power-
opposition relations and quite often within those in office, have eroded the social energy, 
consumed the political actors and prohibited them from achieving significant progress in drafting 
and supporting economic reform.  
1.2.4. The Roman Cabinet (July 1990 - September 1991) has followed in turn the zigzag 
of a contradictory evolution (D) . Starting from the initial advantages of the power structure after 
the May 1990 elections, which also paid the domestic and foreign costs of the June 1990 crisis, 
the team of experts advanced programs related with institution building and the first steps of 
economic reform.  
1.1. 
1.0. 0.0. 
0.1. 
“Policies”
“Politics” 
D 
 
The tensions between the executive and the legislature, between the reforming and the 
conservative FSN wings, along with the manipulation of social relations, have brought Romania 
back to a disqualifying status, owing to the September 1991 miners’ incursion.  
 11
 1.2.5. Coming back to a normal situation was the Stolojan Cabinet’s mission(E), that is 
returning to the May 1990 departure point.  
0.0. 
0.1. 
“Policies”
“Politics”
1.0.
1.1.
 
By putting them next to each other, these periods of time describe ”a vicious circle,” to 
which the Iliescu regime has stuck, between 1990-1992. 
1.2.6.  The  Văcăroiu Cabinet (1992-1996) has acknowledged exactly the status-quo of 
the social-political stability, through stagnation. (F). 
 
1.1.
1.0.
0.1. 
0.0. 
“Policies”
“Politics”
 
A fake reform that combines, through half measures, the postponement and 
reconsolidation of state levers with apparent developments at economic level (economic increase 
through stocks, accumulation of foreign debts, slowing regional and Euro-Atlantic integration). 
1.2.7.  Another sinuous trajectory characterizes the Ciorbea  şi Vasile Cabinets (G) . 
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 0.0. 
0.1. 
“Policies”
“Politics”
1.0.
1.1.
 
Taking advantage of free and correct elections in September 1996, and of the fact that a 
pro-Western coalition took office, these governments have however wasted time, resources, and 
opportunities owing to the permanent political instability, programmed orientation differences 
and the difficult balance of the various interests.  
 
1.3. Changes of the Course of Public Life 
Changing the course of the public life involves a whole range of significant changes in 
the structure of power, of the representation of interests, and the strategic orientation of decision-
making mechanisms in local and central administration.  
The transition was far from a linear process, and the dynamics of the public life highlight 
a permanent tension between these dimensions. At the same time, one must take into 
consideration their specific evolution, unequal timeframe and significance that have provided 
their basic identity, with the most significant impact on stability and the nature of changes. 
It is not by chance that the opportunities for changing of the course of the public life are 
landmarks in recent history. They have established a certain status-quo, which has formed the 
backdrop for interaction between the political sphere and the structural developments in the 
economic-social sphere. 
This assumption is grounded in the idea that in Romania there exists predominantly “the 
up reform,” which shows the overwhelming influence of political factors on the orientation of 
the decision-making mechanisms in the circumstances of a sporadic intervention, often an 
oscillating and contradictory one, of the emerging interest groups. However, it is essential to take 
into account all the above-mentioned three dimensions presented in turn as variable factors.  
The evolution of the political factors from the December 1989 - January 1990 FSN until 
the present resulted in a permanent oscillation of the political influence on the management and 
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 orientation of economic reform. The relatively high degree of political instability both in the 
Administration and in the opposition, but mainly within the political parties and groups, 
represents the main counter-productive influence on the drafting, backing, and finalization of 
relevant economic policy.  
It was not only the sinuous evolution of political parties and groups—inherent in a new 
democracy—but also the very ambiguous relations with the new interest groups that caused 
chronic ambivalence of the political actors.  
In these circumstances, the crises and foreign relations with the IMF, World Bank, or the 
European Union are very often much more influential factors on the orientation of policies. In 
other words, the pressure or the conditions they imposed have had much more authority on the 
politicians than the representatives of interests, observance of the Constitution, or the building of 
consensus on national priorities. Even so, although far from being taken into consideration as an 
argument for the acceleration of economic reform, the economic and social crises were a pretext 
for political actors in office to slow down or even abandon previous initiatives.  
A similar approach has characterized the behavior of the political actors in office in their 
relations with the international financing bodies. Despite foreign conditions that they have 
tended to impose on the orientation of the decision-making mechanisms, the overall balance 
either shows a “sine die” postponement in achieving the set goals, or the abandonment of the 
relationship until the establishment of a new pattern in the public sphere. The relations with the 
IMF, WB and EU have meanwhile become one of the myths of the post-communist Romania.  
Beyond the game of facts and circumstances, after ten years of contradictory 
developments, a truth emerges that is difficult to ignore. The establishment and evolution of 
Romanian public life has not found its place yet in the economic-social reality, such that it may 
answer effectively to the demands of the market through the content and efficiency of economic 
policies. It should also stimulate economic behavior through competition, as well as assure 
domestic consumption and develop the labor market.  
With too few and ephemeral exceptions, partisan political opinions have dominated this 
discourse, driven by conservative or opportunistic approaches, by the influence of economic 
interest groups that seek to take advantage of the agony of the former socialist economy, 
currently lacking the protection of the state dictatorship. Panic-stricken reactions to crises or 
populist concessions to the social reactions of a population confused by a contradictory reality, 
who lacks all perspective, complete this complex of attitudes.  
Although the transition of the post-communist society to the market economy, free 
enterprise and democracy is essentially a liberal revolution, the economic policies of the past ten 
years’ in Romania were everything but liberal. Even the intervention of the international 
financial bodies was often reduced to the role of a “sanitary factor” to maintain the economic-
social stability by some “damage control operation” to overcome the critical moments and not to 
consolidate the course of reform. 
That is why the sinuous and often convulsive evolution of the course of the public life 
represents a revealing reality and an object for analysis that is significant for the understanding 
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 of the Romanian situation, of the causes to bring about internal barriers for reform and, of 
course, for the identification of necessary openings.  
 15
 2. Dialectics of Inertia 
2.1. Sources of Ambiguity 
What are the sources of this excessive complication of the transition’s trajectory in 
Romania? What is in fact behind events, behind the oscillating changes in the orientation of 
social-economic policies? 
How did the political actors relate themselves to what was at stake during transition and 
to what extent did these stakes make them come nearer to or farther from their position for 
reform? To what extent did this position dominate the decision-making mechanisms and 
processes (DMP) as an internal majority current, or was it more a simple syncopated alignment 
to the regional evolution or was it the indirect effect of the anti-crisis measures?  
To be able to answer these questions we shall consider as a starting point a brief 
evaluation of the influence of the main inputs into the decision-making mechanisms. Their 
influence can be seen, in various percentages, depending on the political-social and economic 
circumstances, both in the content of the endorsed policies, but mainly in their practical 
finalization.  
The most influential and relevant influences on the orientation of the policy courses 
during the first ten years of the transition are the following:  
• The power’s programs and priorities (PPP) 
• Structural challenges and constraints (SCC) 
• Social expectations and reactions (SER) 
• The opposition’s political pressures (OPP) 
• Foreign commitments and requests (FCR) 
The combination of these sources’ influence differs from one government to another or 
even within the same government, and the resulting configuration offers a truthful image of the 
sense of transition, beyond statements and formal institutional aspects.  
FCR 
OPP SER 
SCC 
PPP 
 
MPD 
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 2.1.1. Power’s Programs and Priorities or the Official Political Agenda constitute, in 
principle, the formal background, established through the Parliament’s vote, which defines 
exactly the main fields and directions of action in which the transition policies are to be drafted, 
supported, and finalized. Its endorsement explains, on one hand, the forces’ ratio set through free 
elections, the main political trends of the partners from the majority coalition, the current 
economic-social situation, alongside the strategic targets for the foreseeable future. Of course, 
these programs mostly resume the electoral offers of those who had won elections. It is 
considered that they assure the legitimacy and authority of the votes expressed by the population 
at a certain time.  
It is an unanimously acknowledged truth today that in Romania the electoral 
commitments saw only limited realization in finalized policies. This discrepancy indicates in fact 
the electorate’s reduced influence on the orientation of policies, the decreased role of the 
public’s control mechanisms over the government, and the latter’s reduced interests in satisfying 
the commitments they had made in the electoral campaign.  
Had they achieved at least half the list of electoral promises expressed during the past ten 
years Romania would have ended the transition, would have joined NATO, would have a 
genuine chance to access into EU in the years to come, Romanian products would be competitive 
on the foreign market, and its citizens would have been spared the poverty, and the anxiety 
connected today with the inflation, prices, health insurance, etc. 
The discrepancy between promises and actions remains one of the dominant 
characteristics of the new Romanian political class. The main consequences are eroding 
confidence in the political leaders and state bodies, and above all the delays of reform and 
transition. 
2.1.2. Structural Challenges and Constraints have imposed themselves to a much greater 
extent on the orientation of decision-making mechanisms. As they were ignored “until the last 
minute” they found themselves again in hasty measures, in half steps, more to limit the impact of 
the already existing crises and malfunctions. Instead of being considered as landmarks for 
structural policies, of economic recovery and modernization, the economic challenges and 
constraints have been in fact turned into pretexts to postpone reforms.  
A defeatist mentality has gradually become endemic, and people forget that apparently 
unsolved problems are in fact only the consequences of recent failures, not intransigent 
problems. 
The political actors in office tend to hesitate between endorsing short term populist 
decisions, while ignoring economic constraints with serious medium term effects, or conversely 
overestimating the importance of these constraints to impose austerity measures. In both cases, 
the political game is prevailing over the concern for a responsible and realistic governance.  
2.1.3. Social expectations and reactions should constitute a first priority in orienting and 
modeling policies, a significant source to establish the rhythm of changes, the correlations 
among social effort and benefits, as well as the raw material to assure and consolidate public 
support for the reform.  
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 The Romanian experience of transition is moreover traumatic, both at the level of 
individual life, and in relation to the evolution of the new social groups and local communities.  
A serious discrepancy has survived between the dominant political topic and the current 
life topics, at social and economic levels. 
When some frustrations, discontent, reactions, have been taken into consideration, it is 
clear that this process was undertaken selectively, not to set up modernization policies, but to 
influence the balance of power within the political game, to settle scores between rivals, to 
dispose of a free access to power structures, non-censured by the law. “The Miners’ Incursions” 
have sometimes made history in Romania. However, they reversed the direction of evolution, 
and made the institutional system stop exercising its natural duties, distorting or annihilating the 
course of reform.  
The social dialogue has not yet become a significant element of decision-making 
mechanisms, but is rather a slippery field on which is played out the politicization of the 
developing trade union movement, recruiting some of the most influential political leaders, who 
are also concerned with achieving spectacular political careers.  
After ten years of transition, the Romanians find it difficult to understand what 
privatization and restructuring mean. They accept with increased reticence the government’s 
ambitious projects. They are confused in matters related to the near future and they are 
increasingly dependent on the post-communist state, with its populist, paternal offers. 
In a country that has consistently failed to cross the critical thresholds of re-entering the 
free world, the ordinary people fear more the effects of regional and global competition, and 
foreign investors, and it is easy to influence them with nationalistic demagogy.  
Instead of becoming partners of the political efforts supporting good governance, they 
have gradually turned into a humble and stressed mass, and hesitate among exaggerated and 
irrelevant, either left- or right-oriented offers.  
The increased uncertainty of everyday life is thus becoming an unsettling element in the 
political background, severely reducing internal stability, so indispensable to reforms.  
2.1.4. The opposition’s political pressures are one legitimate and productive factor in 
the new Central and Eastern European democracies. In this respect, taking office in turns 
represents most probably an irreversible acquisition of Romanian democratization.  
This has contributed to the decantation of political trends, to the maturing of some 
political factors, to the consolidation of institutions and representative relations at the central and 
local levels.  
The smooth operation of relations between those in office and the opposition assures the 
protection of the minority interests in relation to the rest of the population, the preservation of 
some previous changes at a structural level, the contribution of public and parliamentarian 
debates in drafting viable policies, and the consolidation of public support.  
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 The Presidential body has to play an important role in the function of mediation, in the 
management of internal crises but mostly in the successful passage through moments of 
confusion, and the orientation of structural changes. With too few exceptions, (such as the 
Snagov Declaration in 1995 referring to the assurance of the national consensus in relation to EU 
accession, or the “Round Table” in 1999 referring to the unlocking of the endorsement of 
property laws) this function was exercised in quite a modest manner.  
On the other hand, the relations among those in office and the opposition have 
maintained themselves exclusively at the level of sterile confrontations and have often 
accommodated extremist tendencies. The excessive polarization of the political sphere was also 
fueled by the vain ambition to resume the transition “from scratch,” each previous stage being 
criticized on the basis of particular interests, such as the “disastrous heritage” . . . The obsession 
with their own image and mutual culpability, their preference for diversion and mystification 
have consumed the greater part of the energy and creativity of the new political class’ 
representatives.  
The main result of this “coffee shop drama” that has been laid out during the past ten 
years is the political class’ inability to achieve and maintain the national consensus for the major 
topics of transition. In its absence, the most important structural changes can be achieved only 
with great difficulty, or not at all.  
2.1.5. Foreign Commitments and Requests represent a significant source of political 
influence. This influence extends to the point of modeling policies on those that bring Romania 
nearer to the Western world, rephrasing and consolidating new strategic alliances, and most of 
all, increasing the dependence of the Romanian economy’s on foreign financing and 
investments. In fact, through its own social and economic pattern that gives substance and 
suggests the historical trajectory of the transition, the relations with the West acquire a major 
role. At the same time, it becomes obvious that successful cooperation with great powers have 
greatly stimulated and favored the balanced development of some countries such as Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary in crossing the transition. 
The political actors have constantly done their best and have fully succeeded to turn 
Romania into “Eastern Europe’s terrible child”, an unpredictable, sloppy and inefficient partner 
in most of the strategic change processes meant to assure the reintegration of the former Soviet 
block countries into a stable, viable and prosperous region of the free world.  
However, both these trends and the effects of the foreign support have been severely 
diminished by the lack of consequence, a weak grounding of their own stances, a reduced 
capacity for reaction and for forecasting regional trends, and mainly by a reduced availability to 
open for the implementation of the European standards for economic management at domestic 
level, alongside institutional coherence, and human rights observance.  
The vain trends of traditional isolationist behavior, cosmopolitan obedience or hesitating 
approaches have delayed cooperation, and have progressively decreased the foreign partners’ 
confidence and interest.  
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 In these circumstances, the positive effects of cooperation have been maintained at a 
modest, circumstantial level, leaving Romania at risk of being marginalized and isolated. 
 
2.2. The “Public Involvement Discordance” Syndrome 
The discordance that emerges in the politicians’ and political parties’ approach to public 
problems are a phenomenon specific to transition. The wide prevalence of this phenomenon has 
manifested, during all these years, an ambivalence of political behavior both within the parties 
and moreover in the  power structures, from Parliament to ministries to local administration. 
Consequently decisions, initiatives, declarations, postponements, hesitations and half-steps have 
proliferated in the context of complete operational ambiguity. This ambiguity has drastically 
reduced the efficiency of public action, has introduced various characteristic component 
structures, and has distorted or completely changed the nature of the transformation.  
Of course, there are extenuating circumstances relating to the inherent conditions of an 
emerging political environment. In Romania, these circumstances, understandable in the 
beginning, have turned into an ordinary practice, into a widely spread syndrome among political 
leaders, higher officials, political parties and alliances, and have influenced key moments in the 
decision-making process.  
The “Public Involvement Discordance Syndrome” also describes the political groups 
within the parties and the governing structures. Its main result is a spectacular series of internal 
tensions, divisions and deadlocks, in addition to a general pattern of behavior that amazes 
foreign partners.  
The main consequences of the “DIP” Syndrome within decision-making mechanisms are 
the delay in establishing new structures, the appearance and maintenance of artificial 
vulnerability, a decrease in the leaders’ credibility and the governing bodies’ authority, a 
decrease of institutional coherence, the endorsement of heterogeneous solutions that bring about 
diverging opinions and deadlocks, confusion within the public, confusion within the political 
organizations, and fragmentation of the administration’s activities, among others.  
Other symptoms are the confusing situations resulting when the “DIP” Syndrome 
produces these effects. Christian-Democrats who back decisions that are unfavorable to the 
Christian-Orthodox Romanian church; liberals who impose a taxation system that ruins free 
initiative; Social-Democrats who impose severe restructuring measures while ignoring social 
costs; Socialists who cooperate with rightist Western governments; former radical trade union 
leaders who support authoritarian responses to social rallies; cosmopolitan university professors 
with chauvinistic inclinations; ethnic minority leaders obedient to the single national state; local 
leaders who become upstarts in the capital and back a central budget to the detriment of local 
initiatives; dignitaries with solid economic backgrounds seduced by the political game; other 
dignitaries with humanistic higher education who ignore the precarious conditions in which the 
community of arts barely survives; ignorant people of all political colors who invent and support 
authoritarian utopias, which would make the former communist nomenklatura green with envy... 
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 Of course, the list is much longer, for the mere reason that the “DIP” Syndrome is an 
“operational business”!  
This did not come about by chance. On the contrary, it is a reality that describes the most 
of the human heterogeneous condition, alongside the institutional and situational ones that 
characterize post-communist Romania. The main cause of the perpetuation and proliferation of 
this phenomenon is the lack of clarification and the public authority’s internal decantation. These 
have made the decision-making mechanisms remain open to the influence and intervention of 
completely foreign factors, which are even hostile to a genuinely democratic status-quo.  
Although Romania entered the transition through a Revolution, the December 1989 
events were marked by ambiguities whose impact continues to echo in public life, the dynamics 
of events, and the logic of transformations.  
The most radical separation from communist totalitarianism was “infected” by 
components and factors that have become medium-term paradigms for the content of transition. 
The greatness and misery of the December 1989 Revolution consists exactly in the discrepancy 
between the radical separation from Ceausescu’s regime and the heterogeneous character of the 
factors for change. Similar to “the whole people’s property” in socialism, the revolution 
belonged to everybody and to nobody at the same time. 
A dominant political style emerged from it, which has improved and consolidated itself 
in the following stages, and which has defined the pattern of the post-communist politician, an 
agent of change for personal survival and an instrument for contesting everybody. 
That is why the “DIP Syndrome” afflicts the prominent reformers with a decreased 
capacity to adjust to the consequences of change, generating confrontations between those who 
share the same values and incredible compromises between “deadly enemies.”  
Consequently, what is the internal structure of this political-social mechanism, with 
obvious pathological connotations? 
One can see here an overall set of differences among some essential dimensions of the 
political behavior at the top level of influential organizations and institutions, at the interface 
between the political environment and the public administration.  
The Public Involvement Discordance Syndrome is the expression of tension, of 
differences, between:  
The values projected by image, political color, group association, and the system of 
internal standards of the organization and political alliances;  
The roles allocated within the organizational framework of the political game, of the 
electoral competition or in the public administration system;  
The dominant pattern of behavior applied in exercising attributes, opportunities and 
requests that depend on the functions, responsibilities means of and influence in the public life.  
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 The “DIP” Syndrome can easily be observed in decision-making mechanisms, owing to 
the weakness of the new democratic bodies and the ease with which they are reduced to formal 
matters. This is the way to establish favorable circumstances where the charismatic offer 
dominates the institutional authority. People relate themselves to them more easily, and prefer to 
take the proponents as leaders for the institutions. The “VIP Industry” is the first one to have 
proliferated in Romania after the violent disappearance of the dictator. Ten years after the 
December 1989 Revolution, it is easier now to understand the general relief that followed and 
has instigated spectacular careers for individuals and interest groups. In the previous decades of 
retaliation and manipulation, survival was the personal or collective goal for these aspirants. 
Their priority has become emancipation and a public career, seen from one angle, but from 
another angle they also appear to suffer the temptation of power, of supremacy in public life.  
One of the most important consequences of the December 1989 Revolution was the 
liberation of a minority! After ten years, the majority population can see that the minority’s road 
to emancipation is long, difficult, full of sacrifices, uncertain, and even lacks a certain 
perspective. 
As a matter of fact this is the trap that the “DIP Syndrome” poses to domestic public life. 
The chance of a minor emancipation for those engaged in politics, in the midst of a population 
traumatized by totalitarianism, has ferociously absorbed several thousands of Romanians and 
turned them in public life addicts, people possessed by power. The experience of freedom, but 
mainly the access to the levers of power. are in fact a temptation of the post-communist era. 
Unfortunately this temptation bears an embarrassingly strong resemblance to that of 
totalitarianism.  
The new Romanian political class’ preference for the spectacular but useless political 
game, to the detriment of the public interest, expresses perhaps most acutely the danger of this 
trap. Romanian politicians are still ashamed to be what the democratic culture of the West 
defines as a “public servant.” There, this phrase has become an honor, an acquired honor and one 
must constantly justify it. This effort materializes itself in honorable public careers, which 
represents nothing but a thankless job for the ready-made politician from Romania. From this 
viewpoint, the Romanian society has remained throughout all these years a mediocre post-
communist society, at the level of public life.  
Self-serving personalities, the reinvention of privileges, the access to opportunities under 
the protection of immunity to public control, despise toward transparency and lack of interest for 
honorable situations characterize, unfortunately, the childhood of Romanian democracy.  
That is why, quite recently and with unlimited chances for perpetuation, an ambivalent 
political style has emerged as a dominant feature of the public life. Its structure matured and, 
moreover, it has established itself under the protection of an implicit consensus in the political 
environment. One cannot compare the strength of this political style to the weakness of the 
institutional system inspired by Western democracy. The danger that the institutional system 
may become a mere instrument of the new political class is increasingly obvious; the concern is 
more acute in light of the fact that in societies east of Romania this reality has sunk strong roots.  
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 If we do not fault the public institutions or the political organizations for their names or 
for the image of the buildings where they reside—what has become in fact media routine—then 
a sui-generis mechanism appears to us in a manifestation that is both active and bankrupt for the 
public interest. Ten years of failure in drafting, supporting, and missing the majority of policies 
and programs for Romania’s modernization: we have to acknowledge that such an impressive 
result is not the product of a divine curse, but rather the fruit of consistent, organized, constant 
effort. A negative performance that implies political factors, energy, actions, even competition! 
It was not easy at all! 
We can note that there is some kind of responsibility for failure, for persistence in 
making mistakes, for exercising one’s power with vanity. 
Bad governance consumes budgets, misses opportunities, consigns a confused and 
dependent population to unprofitable work, chases away foreign partners. “Fooling history” in 
the Romania of the 1990’s ultimately is a complicated adventure, which consumes standards, 
times, and beliefs! A public comedy whose characters have style, authority and, of course, an 
efficiency worthy of a better goal.  
“The DIP Syndrome” does not lack diversity—this makes it compatible with pluralism—
and dynamism, which assures it persistence, continuity and even perfection.  
The politicians, the people responsible for public positions, are usually defined through 
compatibility, balance and symbiosis between Identity, Attributed Role, and the Current 
Practices for Exercising Attributions.  
“The DIP Syndrome” expresses exactly the acute discrepancies between these 
dimensions.  
2.2.1. A typical situation, noted mainly in the first period of transition, was the 
discrepancy between the assumed Identity on one hand, and on the other hand the distribution of 
Roles, along with the reduced competence in the concrete exercising of some Practices. The 
formulation of identity constitutes an option which is relatively easy to achieve and to assume 
through the mechanical appropriation of the “hat classified list” of the classical pluralist 
democracy. To a great extent, a game of the masks where “to be of leftist orientation” or “to be 
of rightist orientation”—to be a Christian-democrat, liberal or social-democrat—has reduced 
itself to the registration in one of the tens of parties (reduced from the more than 150 of post 
December 1989 Romania). People unearthed hidden vocations and obsessions, family relations, 
imaginary dissidence, temporary solidarity—and most of all, a new rhetoric.  
It is not by chance that political radicalism has emerged and thrived, related mostly to 
tempers and frustrations, with the explicit purpose of following personalities with some 
uncertain qualities.  
As a matter of fact, it was natural that the assertion of the new system of political beliefs, 
and the assertion of the new identities under circumstances of pluralism and democracy, should 
pass through a phase of general enthusiasm, but also of imposture, hypocrisy and Phariseeism.  
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 Of course, the experience of freedoms of choice and speech has stimulated a dramatic re-
evaluation of both the self and collective groups. The exposure to new values remains one of the 
main resources of the new democracy.  
However, only few would have thought that so many enlightened liberal personalities 
existed under the general communist obedience, including today’s Christian-democrats, 
environmentalists, globalists or fanatics of the regional, sustainable, communitarian 
development. We discovered that we even have “human former Securitate employees,” 
pragmatic communists, and even very pragmatic communists. 
If this eagerness for the “transfiguration” had mainly remained an important episode in 
personal life, then both the separation from communism and the transition would have eventually 
acquired those “roots of the democracy” indispensable to good governance.  
The discrepancy between the “window identity” and the game in the new roles, but 
mainly the preference for the old routine and procedures, has become an important fault of the 
new institutional system! However, this discrepancy has a decisive impact exactly on the 
drafting, supporting and finalization of policies for change. 
The self-absorption of the great majority of Romanian politicians, the obsession with the 
image, the political narcissism, occupy a great part of their working time and represents the 
preferred state of political competition. Slandering others, publicly discrediting one’s opponents 
and even one’s partners follow in order of their importance. Once they reach top positions, these 
politicians disappoint owing to their lack of compatibility with the assumed roles, and harm with 
improper practices either the budget or the national interest.  
2.2.2. The change of the political system has naturally caused a wide transformation of 
the Roles in the public life and their distribution through democratic elections. The 
representative democracy, based on the “party lists system”, the mechanism of the political 
algorithm in dividing prey within the coalitions, has made it possible for a new type of 
dysfunctional situation to spread. The discrepancy between the public Role allotted to a 
politician or to a political party and his/her Identity, but mainly in relation to ordinary practices 
and proceedings, represents another variant of the “DIP Syndrome.” 
This is where the negative effect of the distribution criterion intervenes, in relation to 
public responsibilities and the predominant influence of the circumstantial compromise of the 
political clientele and, quite a few times, of corruption.  
Here one overlooks one essential aspect, namely that the fraudulent benefits of the 
political transactions that usually define corruption do not involve only money, but also access to 
the decision-making process. For many individuals or organizations, being appointed to a very 
leading position, which involves much responsibility, represents a value of exchange similar to, 
or even more tempting than, a preferential loan or undue income, in cash.  
Corruption, in the form of appointment to top positions, has become an ordinary practice. 
Of course, it has various causes. It starts with the supremacy of nepotism, to the pre-electoral 
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 escapes, from blackmail in the media to hidden influences, all of which has helped to establish a 
genuine culture of prey division.  
These mechanisms that distribute roles and responsibilities do not have any connection 
with the political identity of the beneficiaries, and they totally ignore the true capacity to back 
practices and procedures adequate to the targeted institution.  
Competence is the last criterion we are going to take into account. This would complicate 
too much both the political game and the small circumstantial balances.  
We must not overlook the fact that the distribution of public roles to the clientele has 
remained the main source of authority of the political leaders throughout all these years.  
There is no need to additionally highlight the devastating effect of the variant of the “DIP 
Syndrome” on the drafting, backing, and finalization of policies. The problem is whether it 
would be possible to temper it, to limit it in the short term, for the Western democracies show us 
that it will never disappear. 
2.2.3. A third variant of the “DIP Syndrome” is the discrepancy between the new 
practices and procedures on one hand, and the effectively exercised roles in the public life, and 
the genuine political identity of the political actors with official responsibilities on the other. 
Owing to circumstances, a wide range of new practices and procedures have become customary 
in public life. 
The international agreements that Romania has signed with the European Union, the 
Council of Europe, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other partners 
(governments, international political organizations, foundations, political movements, and so 
forth) have played an important role in determining the nature of these practices.  
Each time an important law is endorsed in Romania, a moment of suspense follows “How 
will the standards and implementation rules of the law look?”  
Once we overcome the moment, we return to the reality. The task of implementing the 
laws is most often given to institutions and political factors whose role is to postpone and finally 
compromise the respective law. If the law deals with social protection, it is almost certain that a 
liberal will be appointed to lead it to ridicule. If it is about restructuring or privatization, an 
employee from the planning body of the hated former dictatorship will certainly be present. If it 
is about taxation, it will either be made subject to the retaliation instincts of a former communist 
Machiaveli disciple, or it will be given to an expert in underworld economy.  
If it is about corruption, biologists, geologists, and astronomers will have some role, 
mainly during news conferences, and they will prove themselves experts at proclaiming illusory 
changes.  
Only the aliens have yet to interfere with Romania’s accumulating problems. 
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 There is also a dominant trend in Romanian public life whereby the most radical 
solutions and the most ambitious interventions initiate from politicians and bodies that have not 
the slightest connection with the area in concern. Hamlet plays better the grave digger’s role, 
who plays better Ophelia’s role, who has just gone mad . . . and plays all the roles.  
 
2.3. The Distorting Mechanisms of Policies  
Romania did not lack significant reforming trends, however. In various proportions and 
with various influences, they can be found again in the programs and in the initiatives of the 
great majority of the politicians currently in office or in opposition during these past ten years. 
Moreover, these reforming trends have survived even in the intervals dominated by conservatism 
and crisis.  
One could say that the negative balance of transition confirms exactly the permanence of 
the movement for change, and the separation, in many ways very deep, from the system of 
totalitarian communism. The survival of reform as an orientation, as a partial approach and 
interrupted effort, prompt Romania’s characterization as a “border country.” 
From a geographical-political standpoint it is place at the eastern limit of the Central 
Europe, at the Balkans’ Western limit and in proximity to the former Soviet Union. At the same 
time, Romania is mired somewhere in the middle of the transition process toward modern 
capitalism. 
The stabilization of the inertia is not only an effect of the first years. This inertia persists 
due to the establishment and operation of some distorting mechanisms that influence the 
decision-making processes, Euro-Atlantic integration policies and the finalization of 
modernization. 
The distorting mechanisms are complex groups of political factors, practices and 
institutionalized relations that exercise a constant influence on the decision-making processes. 
These mechanisms often dominate the formal side of public life, avoiding the legislative 
framework or using it only selectively and incompletely. Through concurrent decisions they 
contradict the governance programs, international agreements, and preliminary consensus 
established in elections. The distorting mechanisms mainly characterize the operation of the 
official power structures, but they can also be felt in the relations between those in office and the 
opposition, and quite often in the relation with the interest groups . The distorting mechanisms 
constantly operate in industrial relations and foster confusion and mistrust in the social dialogue, 
and in public communications related to the population.  
Thus, the distorting mechanisms double and in certain periods of time even dominate the 
official public life, the seat power, the internal debate. They consume energy, material, human, 
and institutional resources, but mainly waste domestic and foreign opportunities. They become 
visible mainly owing to their effects and most often direct intervention overlooks them.  They 
are not mentioned, or are simply protected by compromise, incoherence, and lack of power. 
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 It is also significant that the distorting mechanisms are “inherited,” reproducing 
themselves in governance formulas that considered themselves to be different or even contrary. 
The political stage of the 1996 elections was expressed through the thesis of the change of 
Iliescu’s regime, that is to eradicate the postponement of reform, stagnation and corruption.  
The first three years of the “Constantinescu regime” are suitable proof that these 
mechanisms are stronger, have deeper roots, and are more efficient than the CDR’s ambitious 
rhetoric and that of the new coalition that has taken office. In these circumstances, the new 
opinion, relating to the “change of the change,” could seem comical were it not lugubrious. . .  
Consequently, what powers have these factors that effectively combine and exercise in 
real time what the institutional structures, legislative framework and electoral programs claim in 
words and on paper?  
The economic, sociological and political analysis is quite rich in identifying the internal 
devices of these mechanisms. Even political criticism, especially coming from the opposition, 
often refers to this topic. But their influence has never overcome the freedom of speech in 
Romania. Naming them in this study does not only aim at a pure academic or rhetorical interest, 
but it aims at establishing them as targets for action. 
2.3.1. Maintaining Political Instability: as a means for acquiring influential positions of 
power and access to the privileged redistribution that follows the agony of the socialist economy. 
This mechanism results from putting together a complex group of political and para-political 
factors, which also included representatives of those currently in office, and from the remaining 
structures of the former system (old Securitate, local rings of the former communist party, 
representatives from the previous or new underworld economy).  
It is significant to notice that the “Mechanism of Political Instability” has had cyclic 
interventions whenever Romania was faced with endorsing a final decision in relation to the 
course of reform, whenever the reforming trends were about to generalize the course of reform 
and of approaching deep structural targets.  
It seems strange, but nevertheless it happened, that the rightist political forces’ were 
tempted to involve themselves in the ambiguous circumstances of the first years of transition 
with support and even promotion for political instability, which they considered to be a 
prerequisite for access to the office in the absence of popular support.  
At the same time, we must underline the high degree of involvement in the new social 
movement, in particular the important role played by the new trade union elite in starting events 
with disturbing consequences on the course of reform. 
These events’ controversial and never fully clarified character—from whence came the 
now-famous “the miners’ incursions”—make the full elucidation of this mechanism’s internal 
devices very difficult, and tempts simple speculation. However, from the past ten years’ 
perspective, it becomes increasingly obvious that these would have never started, and most of all 
their influence would have not been so important, without the complicity of certain state bodies, 
from the Parliament to the Secret Services.  
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 The presence of the “Political Instability Mechanism” on the governing alliances had a 
special, very corrosive form. 
Both the operation of the “Red Quadrilateral” of the coalition that the PDSR had made 
with parties that were anything but reforming (PUNR, PRM, PSM) and also of the former 
democratic opposition’s coalition (CDR, USD, UDMR) were torn apart by the great presence of 
the political tensions in relation to the institutional effort of supporting and finalizing some valid 
economic and social policies. One cannot ignore the private media’s partial involvement, that of 
the public television stations, and of the other factors that influence the social relations, taking 
into account their remarkable performances in manipulating public opinion, in distorting and 
deviating the meanings of the reforming policies.  
This mechanism had a very costly direct effect on Romania’s foreign image, on its 
prestige in regional competition and on its attractiveness to foreign investments.  
2.3.2. The mechanism of reform delay represents the most important form of political 
involvement in deviating the course toward reform, which has mainly inspired and oriented the 
Vacaroiu Cabinet throughout its glorious survival.  
Apart from the current argument with “the poor relatives” from the PDSR’s alliance after 
the victory in the 1992 elections, the Vacaroiu government has systematically implemented a 
“double accountancy” for drafting and backing economic and social policies. 
Starting with the fake privatization through populist policies - “the great voucher 
allotment” - through which the state’s withdrawal from the economy turned into a new “Song to 
Romania on Shares” festival, to the systematic failure of the agreements concluded with the 
IMF, the World Bank and the European Union, The Postponement Syndrome has started to have 
followers and will remain an unforgettable chapter in the “Charter of the Romanians’ Failure of 
the Reform.” 
The unhealthy economic increase and the accumulation of stocks, the foreign debt and 
compromising the local administration’s autonomy are accomplishments of the politics of the 
multi-lateral Counter-reform. 
The burden of this term of office does not excuse the Ciorbea government’s hesitations. 
On the contrary, it has stimulated resumption of the vicious circle in maintaining stability 
through stagnation, to the detriment of steady modernization.  
2.3.3. Corruption has caused resources to be wasted, opportunities to be missed, and has 
given palpable and consistent expression to uselessly performed social labor.  
Aside from its criminal aspects, and those related to specific charges that have been 
leveled in public debate, The Mechanism of Corruption has significantly distorted decision-
making mechanisms, the orientation of policies, and the formulation of strategic choices among 
which privatization ranks as among the most important. In the first months that followed the 
collapse of the old system—with its characteristic discipline through retaliation—one could feel 
growing the influence of some in dubious business circles, completely unaware of the logic of 
 28
 the market and of the ethics of free competition. The legend of “Ceauescu’s accounts,” 
substantiated by now-forgotten facts from before 1989, refers to the existence and proliferation 
of an underworld economy and a black market of goods in the socialist era, a significant matter 
in a society rent by shortages.  
The germs of corruption, of the financial-economic crime, originate from the old 
system’s “golden epoch” heritage and, as a matter of fact, are also present in the pre-communist 
tradition. 
In the circumstances of transition through “half measure” policies, the Mechanism of 
Corruption has assured the fraudulent allotment of the “lion’s share” to the political clientele of 
the generations that followed. It seems that there was no exception, taking also into account the 
continuous series of scandals that have accompanied the transition.  
The major risk posed by the operation and mainly by the expansion of corruption is not 
merely theft at the macro-economic level, but moreover the control it can exercise on decision-
making and political mechanisms at the national level. 
This risk—more grave than foreign aggression—confront the new East European 
democracies with large-scale economic implications.  Beyond this, however, these nations must 
fear its institutional implications, with its operation now hardly hindered at all. 
The case of Russia remains a very obvious reference , where “the supremacy of the 
Mafiosi structures over the whole people” seems to be an already established fact.  A similar fate 
appears to be a very accessible option for those post-communist societies that fail or are late in 
finalizing the reform. 
The fact that the best weapons against corruption are not the police and justice but 
privatization is an acknowledged truth. 
2.3.4. Toleration of Population’s Progressive Poverty is a product of the inefficiency of 
economic management and the demagogic interpretation of the costs of transition. 
The premises for this distorting mechanism consist in the division between the emerging 
political class and a very confused population, extensively exposed to the unfavorable 
consequences of the former socialist economy and to the failure of the economic policies that 
have substituted themselves for reform. 
The constant concern of the new privileged groups, among which the politicians had 
easily found a comfortable space for maneuver, is to promulgate facilities, discriminatory 
licenses and conditions protected by immunity.  Yet these concerns contrast deeply to the range 
of vulnerable conditions and frustrations experience by the population, and the formal social 
protection which they are assured. 
The complicity of those in power in the proliferation of poverty in a country suffering an 
extended transition is shocking; more shocking than that is only the denial they demonstrate in 
refusing to acknowledge the general poverty they have produced in these ten years. Despite 
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 ongoing human suffering, turning daily interaction into mutual aggressiveness and despair, the 
political actors persist in ignoring a fact of strategic importance. 
It is obvious that the people’s poverty has contributed decisively to undermining the 
labor market, to depleting the resources for consumption and domestic demand and last, but not 
least, to depleting Romania’s capacity to sustain the its competitiveness on the foreign market. 
The isolation of politics in a public life marked by events that are both spectacular and 
useless, its isolation from the human resources of development, are the most important mistakes 
of the first ten years of transition. 
What would be the outcome of the public’s isolation, when it is frustrated by 
shortcomings and when its expectations of the political environment are limited to current 
needs? Apart from electoral indifference, the political support for economic recovery and 
modernization are drastically reduced.  
This makes room for populist gestures, political extremism, and aggressive reactions 
misled by lack of perspective. 
After all, the transition belongs to the Romanian society and the loss of the social 
partnership does not represent a simple electoral failure, but a source for the disintegration of the 
national interests system. There are neither political institutions nor armies strong enough to 
defend the national body of a society under disintegration.  
2.3.5. Ambivalence toward the West 
A bright viewpoint of Western capitalism has replaced the communist perspective of 
bankruptcy in demagogic address, and potentially in conventional wisdom as well. As a matter 
of fact, that which characterizes most Romanian society after ten years of transition is exactly its 
lack of an accessible viewpoint, on the grounds of certain and correlated domestic developments. 
At the end of the 20th century, Romania is a chaotic democracy where the people’s daily 
concerns have no connection with the new political class’ cosmopolitan and ambitious 
predictions. 
From the “library whose books nobody reads” of electoral programs from the past 
decade, one might find it difficult to distill a lucid and systematic historical, future-oriented 
reference (even those who assumed office failed to read those books after the elections). 
In fact, it is the overwhelming priority of the public administration in its happy days to 
escape the crisis of the true socialism, which the fall of the dictatorship has allowed to develop 
without the constraints imposed by retaliation structures. The fact is well known that the great 
Western powers and, to a small extent, the international financing bodies have embraced the 
post-communist societies in their new spheres of influence as if they were “history’s orphans.” 
The crisis-solution packages, including Euro-Atlantic integration policies and material 
aid distributed according to severe criteria emerging from strategic interests previous to the cold 
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 war, represent a global mechanism with major regional implications for Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
In fact these have offered the most stable influences on the region during the past ten 
years, which the dynamics of post-communist regimes were otherwise marked by unpredictable, 
sinuous evolutions. 
Without reaching the coherence and consistency of the Marshall plan, the Eastern 
European transition assistance programs have employed their maximum effort to maintain 
stability in the region and to prevent the restoration of substitute nationalistic communist 
regimes, in cases where the fall of the communist regimes was only perfunctory. 
However the partnership with the West has become a genuine “oxygen supply” for the 
post-communist governments, mainly for those who saw themselves cheated out of their secret 
expectations for a rapid revival of the former Russian empire. 
In these circumstances the pro-Western stances, the movement back toward Europe, and 
mainly the persistent visits paid to the capitals of these countries have become a “fashionable 
practice” of the new political class. The imitation of the pro-Western attitudes, the openings 
toward the West, have established a broad trend, gladly embarked upon by the political leaders 
who kept on trying to please the Western leaders, the new centers of influence in the world’s 
political scene. Their access to free travel and mainly to the “sanitary assistance” of Western aid 
are still difficult problems. 
On the other hand, the fall of the former CAER’s economic exchanges has deeply altered 
not only the foreign economic circuits, but to a greater extent the standards of performance for 
the domestic economy. 
Regional security was affected more deeply by exposure to the competition of goods 
from the Western market than by the very discreet disappearance of the Warsaw Treaty.  
Under these circumstances, “ good relations with the West” has become a truth of 
domestic politics, irrespective of the government’s political color.  
If only political realism and economic calculations were to prevail in the evolution of 
these relations, things would have finally arrived at a certain normal condition. Nevertheless, the 
capacity of the new post-communist political class’ for dissimulation in its relations with the 
Western partners is amazing. 
Even in the case of the somehow finalized experience with Euro-Atlantic integration, 
with some countries awarded for their efforts, the Western officials and representatives were not 
spared surprises that almost astonished them. These are to persist with the ongoing process of 
integration. 
In Romania’s case, a whole group of domestic political factors has combined in a 
constantly ambivalent attitude toward the Western values, toward procedures and standards 
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 without which partnership and cooperation are meaningless words, ranging from the ridiculous 
slogan “We do not sell our country!” to some occasional politician’s inefficient obedience. 
The explicit or hidden nationalistic attitude—its visibility determined by its satisfaction 
of the “assistance without obligations” condition; the discrepancy between festive statements and 
the capability to act; hesitating options between Moscow and Washington; and above all the 
modest capacity to update the market economy and the democracy at home, have amazed the 
West daily, to the point of indifference.  
As a conclusion, a foolish and vain grudge has come to express the dissatisfaction that it 
is more difficult to fool the Westerners than your own country’s people.  
Under the circumstances, as much as it was, the influence and consistency of Western 
support has decreased, has become less certain and is already bearing the burden of failures 
suffered in Madrid, Luxembourg, Washington, Paris, Bonn, Tokyo, and other capital cities of the 
world.  
There is no need for additional focus on the strategic risk of Romania’s marginalization, 
of its being isolated in a region that has been and will be marked by instability for a long time. 
The question is under what circumstances could this risk be taken into consideration both 
at the level of political structures and mainly at that of drafting, supporting, and finalizing 
policies? 
 
2.4. Diversity and Dynamics of Governance Patterns 
The analysis of the distorting mechanisms becomes increasingly relevant if we go deeper 
into their impact on the governance of transition. The main mission of the political actors 
consists of supporting a government capable of assuring the irreversible character of changes, the 
consolidation of the new economic-social structures, and the assurance of some relevant 
openings in relation to domestic, regional, and global trends. 
In these circumstances, the transition’s “good governance” is permanently related to three 
main fronts of public action, in different variants: 
Crisis management and prevention. The intervals of social-political instability and those 
of economic unbalance were predominant in the first stages that followed the fall of the 
communist political system and the bankrupt socialist economy. Later on, governance faced 
structural and social unbalances that were related with the assertion of the new market 
mechanisms, with the social fragmentation and stratification, with the presence of some 
differences in the foreign relations. 
The size of these unbalances, their combination in crisis and conflictual structures 
favored the influence of the distorting mechanisms. The maintenance of political instability, the 
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 delay of reforms, the proliferation of corruption or of financial-economic crime, alongside 
others, severely limit the public administration’s capacity to moderate the crisis of transition.  
Support for structural changes represents the “tough core” of governance during 
transition. This explains why good governance is mistaken for reform, mainly with the economic 
reform in its development as a strategic process. The management of coherent and correlated 
policies, the assurance of the rhythm of change, the maintenance of the transformations’ course 
toward the generalization of the market economy, the stabilization of the labor market in a 
genuine affiliation with the modernization process, and so forth, represent the basic elements of 
good governance. The impact of the distorting mechanisms first of all affects the selection 
process of strategic targets, of the moments to start the changes,  as it entails deadlocks and 
obstacles. “The vicious cycle” that has characterized the evolution of privatization and unhealthy 
economic increases—including macro-economic stability and restructuring inertia—is a 
notorious example of the bankrupt governance of change. 
The assurance of functional balances is yet another one of the essential pillars of 
governance during transition, owing to the high volatility of the economic-social reality. This 
balance mainly aims at the major fields of public action which in normal conditions assure the 
operation of the production processes of economic-social life.  
The assurance of public services, of the rule of law, the maintenance of public health, 
national education, and relations among central and local power, of the public communication 
and of other similar sectors between normal standards, are aspects that cannot be put “between 
brackets” in highly volatile periods. These fields achieve mainly the reproduction and 
productivity of human resources at the national level, and assure a decent living standard for the 
majority of the population.  
The efficiency of the distorting mechanisms in maintaining the operational balance can 
be seen today in the proliferation of poverty, crime, social polarization, in the decline of the 
population’s health and productive capacity, and in the waste of social work. 
These circumstances favor the development of “parallel spaces” in the social-political life 
such as “the black market of the labor force,” fiscal evasion, organized crime, manipulation and 
mystification through media channels, parasitism, prostitution, and so forth. 
At their extreme, their amplification reaches critical thresholds of some trends of the 
social cohesion disintegration, where they establish conditions and fields that cannot be 
governed.  
The experience of the first ten years highlights a number of aspects of governance in 
relation to the asymmetrical combination of these three types of targets. Depending on domestic 
or international circumstances, on assumed and backed priorities, the management of crises, the 
structural reforms and the concern to assure operational balances get a different share of and give 
a special characteristic to the act of governance. 
This typology of governance in relation to the priority targets highlights exactly the role 
of the political and institutional factors in managing the transition. 
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 2.4.1. Militant governance with a pretense of reform, which focuses on overcoming the 
crises of the former system in order to bring about fractures at institutional and structural levels. 
Crisis management becomes the main instrument for change. This requires that some 
functional disequilibrium arise within a specific time frame, fueled by the public’s desire 
separate itself from the past. One can also notice a consensus for overcoming the intervening 
period through the predictable consolidation of a new status-quo. In Romania, this type falls 
within the standards of governance of the first provisional structure, in place between January 
1990-July 1990.  
The rapid compartmentalization of the domestic political environment in January-
February 1990 resulted in the contradictory nature of this period. It led to the fracturing of public 
consensus, during the crisis in June 1990, and has left a situation of permanent instability in the 
internal political life.  
The majority of present political behavior was instigated in this period, and has become a 
paradigm for the Romanian transition. 
Moreover, the trend to associate social tensions with political conflict, to manipulate and 
absorb vulnerable and dependent social categories in the political conflict, has amplified 
instability and has also distorted other processes of change of the associative structures, at the 
level of mentalities, at the level of public debate, and so forth. 
Instead of using the governance of change to overcome the crises of the old system, the 
Romanian political environment has relied instead on the use of the social instability.  
Meanwhile the social resources, the Romanians’ post-revolutionary enthusiasm, were wasted in 
confusion and conflict. 
2.4.2. Conversely, other Central European countries, which responded to crisis more 
rapidly, profited from some preliminary but substantial structural changes, combined with the 
assurances offered by minimal functional balances. The pragmatism and value of certain 
premises relating to the preservation of the private economy’s traditions, and the more rapid 
adjustment of the public and the labor market to the new conditions and opportunities, facilitated 
a more rapid start for the reform policies in the Czech Republic and in Hungary, mainly in the 
form of economic reforms and incentives for foreign investment. 
The solid foreign support was important under the circumstances, precisely because it 
was not wasted through instability, hesitations, and domestic deadlocks. 
In Romania, the relatively stable situation that followed after September 1990 assured a 
several-month interval to the Romanian government, involving a similar approach for the period 
September 1990-July 1991. 
The political constraints within the FSN, consisting of tensions between the reforming 
and the conservative wings, have however limited the scope of change in the field of legislation, 
and limited the extent of action during “the window of opportunity” that closed suddenly in 
September 1991. 
 34
 The Roman government was established in the interval immediately following the June 
1990 “University Square” crisis and it also fell owing to the return and the predominance of 
political crisis, this time the miners’ incursion in September 1991. 
2.4.3. “Take Care of Government” represents another pattern where the goals become 
minimal, focusing on management of the social and political consequences of crises, on 
recovering macro-economic stability and the functional balances of public services at 
administrative level. 
The title of this reform is put in quotation marks because there is neither political nor 
social support, nor the political will institutionalized through the governance program, to initiate, 
support and finalize policies for economic changes. 
From this perspective, the Stolojan Government has seen relative success at the level of 
recovering stability at the cost of a controlled delay of the initiation of reform. 
2.4.4. Governance by Stability Through Stagnation involves assuring functional 
balances at the cost of neglecting the reconsolidation of administrative structures. This is a 
populist distribution of public resources in order to maintain a provisional and apparent social 
peace. For a society in transition, placing stability as a main or even exclusive goal of 
governance may come as a surprise. In Romania, this pattern of governance was employed by 
the Vacaroiu administration and received endorsement from the PDSR coalition.  
The Vacaroiu government has in fact subordinated economic policy to some conservative 
political requirements that reemerged after the FSN’s division into various forms of socialist or 
nationalistic populism.  
The recrudescence of state property and of bureaucracy demanded a period of 
management through stagnation. The costs of consolidating power structures included the 
restriction of political diversity, the social compromise of egalitarian social protection, and 
economic growth on grounds opposing the competitiveness of the free market. 
Romania has succumbed to inertia and has slowly withdrawn from regional competition.  
Consequently, the West is losing interest in supporting Romania’s effort with financial and 
political assistance. 
Although it has successfully survived the pressures of the democratic opposition and has 
ended its term of office without major crises, the Vacaroiu government could not avoid the 
accumulation of major structural deficiencies at the economic-financial level and has gradually 
exhausted the material resources of the social compromise based on the populist redistribution of 
social protection. 
The fall of the Iliescu regime’s popularity before the 1996 elections has proven that this 
model of governance assures neither the structural performance for clearing obstacles nor the 
public credibility needed for the maintenance of social support. 
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 Conversely, the costs of the Vacaroiu pattern of governance have deeply marked the first 
period of the “change of regime” after the 1996 elections. The Ciorbea government has fully 
borne the shock of the “waking up to reality” and has paid the price for resuming the effort for 
structural change. This has contributed to the postponement of raising reform as a top priority. 
2.4.5. Governance through management of deficiencies and of stagnation, recovery of 
functional balances. 
However, these conditions fail to fully explain the postponement of reform from 1997, 
and the waste of the first year of the term of office after the September 1996 elections. 
The divergent internal political opinions played a decisive role in a heterogeneous 
coalition, made up of Christian-democrats and liberals on one hand (united together in the CDR) 
and the social-democrats from the PD—concerned with reclaiming office and recovering the 
helm at economic and administrative levels—on the other hand. The obsession with the 
unilateral achievement of the ethnic-related claims of UDMR, who is the fourth partner in the 
coalition, has contributed to instability. This conglomerate of trends and orientations has from 
the very start produced a malfunctioning political mechanism and almost permanent political 
instability. Again, the priorities of politics were prevailing in relation to the mobilization of 
institutional energies toward drafting, supporting and finalizing the policies of structural change, 
mainly at economic and social levels. 
The poor decision to maintain an apparent social balance in order to beautify Romania’s 
foreign image leading up to the June 1997 NATO Madrid reunion exacerbated the existing 
situation, as it fueled the illusory expectation that Romania would be invited in the first wave of 
the North-Atlantic Alliance’s expansion. Shortsightedness and vanity on the part of a majority of 
the coalition leaders encouraged their descent back into noisy stagnation. 
The political dispute and personal ambitions, “the battle for the algorithm” of the 
redistribution of top positions to party clientele, have overshadowed a constant but minute 
concern for the functional balance that failed entirely to support public services and modernize 
the administration. 
The waste of the first 200-300 days of the much-promised “Contract with Romania” left 
the new coalition with a serious handicap. Moreover, it brought back the political instability 
mechanism, and failed to eradicate corruption and halt the population’s impoverishment. 
2.4.6. Under these circumstances, the second term of office of Ciorbea’s government, 
from February - April 1998, resumed the stubborn and useless exercise of political crisis 
management.  
The minimal control over the functional balances was lost slowly but surely under the 
pressures of diverging political opinion, and the coalition reached the limit of cohesion. The 
management of structural reforms has practically disappeared from the list of priorities for the 
new government. 
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 Given the circumstances, the very first months of the Vasile government dealt mainly 
with repairing the balance and cooperation among the partners in the coalition. 
2.4.7. Romania is not the only one to bear governance marked by the predominance of 
the efforts for structural change. The “shock therapy” variant is its doctrinal application, and 
adjustment is in fact implemented over short intervals even in the other Central European 
countries. This method of governance bases itself on the assurance of some functional balances 
set in administrative structures and social services that are already modernized and efficient.  
In Romania, the reform of the public administration is part of a collection of topics for 
debate, the civil servant’s statute is part of the collection of the transition myths, and the faulty 
decentralization of budgets toward local administration has taken the public services beyond the 
threshold of bankruptcy. 
The use of this model of analysis however illuminates one peculiar aspect of Vasile’s 
government. 
If during the past six months (February - September 1999) support has grown for 
restructuring policies—mainly in the banking system—for austerity policies that make social 
reactions and control of minimal balances seem less important, and for economic recovery in 
general, they are mainly the result of: 
• Awareness of the financial collapse spectrum and the imminent start of a “Bulgarian 
crisis” 
• Massive realignment of decision-making mechanisms and processes to a course of 
policies coming out from the agreements concluded with the IMF and WB. 
• Consequently, one realizes that it is still not possible in Romania for internal political 
forces to achieve a reform-driven governance, in spite of the fact that avoiding 
economic collapse is their essential mandate. 
• Imminent crisis thus becomes the only impetus for a reforming orientation.  
• “Reform out of Fear”, the fear of collapse, has a greater influence than the 
governance programs, the representation of the electorate’s interests, or the need to 
perform. 
The Romanian political class has exhausted all tricks for postponement, dissimulation, 
and deviation of structural reform, and it has come to a crossroads. It either carries out economic 
recovery and structural transformation programs under the command of the international 
financing bodies, or it returns, as it has before, to the management of crises, to all types of games 
and populist gestures.  
Having run out of resources to waste, and facing a population confused owing to 
shortcomings, the Romanian politicians prepare themselves for the elections. 
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 The negative diversity of the governance patterns, exhausted as typology in the first 
decade of the transition, is increasingly suggesting that the cycle might be resumed soon, after 
the 2000 general elections.  
 
2.5. Generalized Negative Functionality  
The Good Governance of the Transition involves assuring effective management of 
crises, orientating and finalizing structural changes, and preserving minimal balances in public 
services. The identification of deadlocks, of distorting effects, illustrates the nature of the 
inefficient approach with a wide expansion that has characterized the past ten years.  
The routine of governance sets in rapidly even in emerging political environments. A 
new set of practices, mentalities and typical reactions receive implicit endorsement as rules of 
public life. In Romania’s case a routine has even established itself (prematurely) in the 
institutional system, despite the fact that different and apparently opposed political forces have 
taken office in turn. The perpetuation of political behavior has perpetuated failure. 
Even if each administration started its term of office with a harsh criticism of “the hateful 
heritage”, it did not take long for the routine set in, for the inertia of the system to return the 
economy to deadlock, and to add new faults to the social burden of the transition. 
The continuity of negative management in Romania through all these years raises serious 
questions about the relevance of the diversity of doctrinaire political pluralism, and the relevance 
of political competition as a seed for pluralist political systems in the new democracy, though 
they be very sonorous, photogenic and costly. 
This continuity is not a simple repetition, it has fueled a complex process of expansion 
over the new spheres of social action, has constantly grounded the modernization trends, 
consuming resources and opportunities. 
The general poor efficacy represents the main internal obstacle separating Romania from 
the finalization of transition, from reintegration into the free world, from the direct and 
substantial access to the benefits of civilization and global development.  
This mode of operating is mainly the product of the typical methods through which the 
political factors relate themselves to the practice of governance. 
In principal, these modalities, which do not lack a certain diversity that might seem 
confusing at first sight, come from the way in which the political factors relate themselves to 
some of the dimensions of reference of the governance during transition, mainly of those who 
control the structures of power.  
For the economy of this analysis we shall select three of the most relevant ones for 
Romania’s case, also taking into consideration the criteria for their constant aggregation 
throughout this interval (1990-1999). 
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 2.5.1. The formulation of the official economic-social agenda as an electoral program, 
governance program or, in many cases, as an international cooperation agreement on topics of 
strategic interest certainly represents a primary landmark in understanding the dynamics of 
governance. 
If we consider that the reform is a medium-term, constant, strategic process (10-20 
years),the relevance of the official agenda, as a public document, with an institutional value 
should be clear. The Parliament’s vote gives it its legal importance, and the document is meant to 
reflect the priority targets and the contract concluded between those in office and the society, in 
an interval of time defined by the Constitution. 
There are quite a lot of fields in which the experience of the transition shows Romania to 
be “a chaotic democracy”. The topic of the “Official Governing Agenda” holds top position in 
the “fuzzy type” games, which are widespread among the Romanian national sports, mainly with 
the politicians. If we want to have a sound opinion that something certain is not going to take 
place in Romania in the near future, it will be very useful to consult these official documents, 
which fill the officials’ drawers, once presented in the electoral campaign or officially endorsed. 
Whoever has enough patience to compare the very meaning of these public documents with 
Romania’s real evolution in the first ten years of transition will be totally amazed. 
This does not mean that the full implementation of these programs would have assured 
good governance and an easy transition for the population. In fact, the only dangers that the 
politicians have avoided without too many efforts are some of the goals stipulated in their own 
programs. 
It is not by chance that the Romanians have a childish preference for the leaders that have 
not done anything yet. 
Both the lack of coherence in action, and the irrelevance of some options and orientations 
included in the Official Agenda of those who had taken office so far, explain the unconvincing 
evolution of the transition process.  
The main faults in formulating the Official Agenda that have affected the practice of 
governance are: 
The absence of a coherent strategic perspective that addresses genuine economic and 
social dynamics. A reactive approach, a reluctance to confront true and not imaginary 
challenges, a cosmopolitan pretense and a nostalgic dependence are dominant characteristics of 
the thinking and practice of post-communist politicians.  
A continuous discordance between the parties’ political agendas and the people’s 
expectations. Individual pride and party dogma have been proliferating at a high level in public 
policy, owing to a systematic failure to notice the concrete evolution of the social-economic 
situation. This cleavage not only grinds public performance, it also causes a premature erosion of 
trust in democracy, in the valences of the market economy, in the orientation toward the free 
world. The recrudescence of nostalgia for communism, of course a selective process, distorted 
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 by the absence of retaliation and dictatorship, represents the unavoidable reaction of a public 
who is tired of the indifference and isolation of the new political class.  
Insolence toward domestic or foreign expertise, except for in cases of crisis or the rapid 
loss of popularity, renders certain programs ill-informed and therefore irrelevant. 
The modest influence of public control over the establishment of public commitments, 
due to an incomplete and inefficient institutional and juridical system, favors an excessive 
tolerance for the systematic failures of those who take the helm of the state. We might say 
therefore that things could be worse, but the multiple costs of maintaining the Official Agenda at 
the level of a “week-end magazine” make us restrain our praise.  
2.5.2. Mastery of the Structural Dynamics constitutes another essential dimension of the 
governance in transition. The concern of public administration is focused on counteracting the 
effects of the socialist economic crisis that still persist after the fall of the state system and the 
secondary consequences of the policies of change. At both the macro-economic level and the 
level of local administration this activity involves more than the simple management of 
bureaucratic functions. Very often, the flexible resolution of crises tests less the administrative 
structures than the main national decision-making bodies, such as the Parliament, the 
Government, the Office of the President, agencies, and special services. 
A new culture of deficiencies has proliferated in the Romanian political environment, 
faced with both unlimited access to the levers of power and a great number of unpleasant 
surprises. 
Late intervention is undoubtedly the government officials’ preferred way of taking 
action. Even when they are in the opposition, the politicians are more energetic, firm and clever 
when difficulties have already manifested in economic and social life. The system has not 
learned to anticipate the negative experiences of other countries. On the contrary, a strange 
temptation to experiment with everything that might go wrong seems to inspire those “who 
pretend to work” in the official buildings. If it is true that the leftist movement was the disease of 
the childhood of communism, it is obvious that the inclination for catastrophe has made 
followers in Romania after communism’s demise. However, it is the voting body—not those 
who hold office—who must pay the costs of these reckless structural evolutions. These are the 
workers, consumers, and tax payers.  
The practice of half-measures in conceiving and implementing solutions follows 
naturally from this position, and it explains fully the existing governance style, in which pressure 
from material constraints or social reactions precipitates hasty endorsement of circumstantial 
policies. These half-measures are meant to ease a state of affairs that increasingly defies reason. 
There is even an internal political competition between half-measures, which makes the 
expression of the voters’ options increasingly difficult. “Things can be done this way too” has 
become a mantra in the new financial-economic bureaucracy and among those who are asked to 
answer to the public’s confusion, as they commute between receptions with foreign delegations. 
Another common practice involves shifting difficulties away from one area by simply 
redistributing unjustified costs to areas not yet affected by crisis. This infects the fields that 
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 might assure dynamism, openness and performance with the deficiencies suffered elsewhere. 
Excessive taxation, steadily destroying the private sector, today plays the role  previously held 
by incursions of migratory people. 
Ignorance of the separation of powers seems to be a privilege reserved for the refined 
ones, who are at the very top positions of the political system. We witness hazardous 
initiatives—ranging from the fight against corruption to pro-investment environmental 
policies—suitable for international conferences but unfit for mastering the precarious and 
volatile economic reality. Political developments generate a “black humor” anthology, deriving 
from the sober horror that the drive to defeat political opponents exceeds both in creativity and 
energy efforts to remedy the current situation.  
2.5.3. Constant support for the government’s actions, necessary in any sovereign state, 
has remained a unfulfilled desire of the new Romanian democracy.  
Though we might not notice the conspicuous similarity between the imposing 
architecture of public buildings and the attitude of their occupants, we can hardly ignore the way 
in which the public officials resemble education faculties that do not deign to lecture. 
Operational discontinuity in the main structures of power, including the Parliament, 
Ministries, the Presidency and other specialized agencies, has become a structural fault of the 
new political environment.  
The past ten years’ experience provides several examples, based on “famous 
achievements”: 
The discrepancy between the current activity of the state bodies and government policy is 
constant, and in many areas it is increasing. The problem of non-governed areas has expanded. 
They are part of the formal attributions of the hundreds of newly established institutions that also 
receive financing and assistance. Conversely, the withdrawal of the state from fields that, owing 
to their nature and substance, would function better and more profitably without the chaotic 
intervention of the bureaucracy, knows a resistance comparable to that of the French. Older 
employees, some of them famous in the old regime, or newer ones, better known in intimate 
family chronicles, are walking around confused, however serene, in the halls of some buildings 
that had been built in a hurry during the last years of the Ceausescu dictatorship. A cleavage 
announcing serious crises is developing between them and the hot, daily, structural topics of the 
Romanian reality. Conversely, there are quite a few young people, trained according to 
international standards, that experiment on their own account with circumstantial occupations or 
even the academic unemployment. 
Here, one can see a chronic discordance between the public functions and the areas of  
competence and involvement of the infantry of Romania’s modern bureaucracy. It is equally true 
that the discordance persists owing to the promotion of the parties’ clientele to key positions in 
the new bodies of the transition.  
The tacit or explicit abandonment of substantial initiatives represents a common recourse 
of government action. The Romanian government did not miss out on the holiday of superficial 
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 modernization, the festive spirit of acquiescing to all the Western modernization rhetoric that the 
Central and Eastern European governments have accepted. On the contrary—since everyone 
enjoys spending money—budgets were allotted with magnanimity, leaving all initiative funded: 
not impressive governmental programs, nor administrative structures to promote the new 
economic recovery, nor social protection, nor communitarian development, nor transparent 
public communication, nor stimulation of the new human resources processes. 
Even if these initiatives suffered from being planted on a field still inadequately 
prepared—or planted simply on the fertile field of cosmopolitan vanity—they could have 
stimulated trends and eased genuine expectations at the public level. 
Yet the more spectacular their media launch was, the more certain was their slow 
disappearance from everyday routine, amplified by the deficit of efficiency of the post-
communist state’s bodies. Many trips abroad, too few to the real Romania; many demagogic 
statements, little direct practice. 
A suspiciously long series of governmental drafts lie about—starting with the 
introduction of industry to the regional market, to regional development, poverty fighting, 
legislative reform and public service reform—and this list does not even include the initiatives 
that were begun, but never finalized. 
Wasted budgets, missed opportunities, increasing frustration.  
A crisis-response cadre is maintained and expanded in order to detract attention away 
from the poor performance of administrative bodies with superficial and sensational motions. 
The transition governments also benefit from some past (communist) and future 
traditions of mobilizing the state’s bureaucracy and the population in the eleventh hour. They 
prefer to reserve this “heroic” behavior for those “critical situations” they have been developing 
for a long time. 
Alarming statements, theatrical confrontations, and spectacular gestures are hard habits 
for the Romanian bureaucrats to break, and they offer juicy raw material for the tabloids. The 
management through crisis has proved to be the institutional practice that best answers to the 
vocation and genuine capacities of the new post-communist political class. 
The constant result has been an unpredictable, unstable and inefficient Romania.  
This false heroism conceals—though with increasing difficulty—their incompetence, 
inconsistency and their dubious taste for drama, which lacks any relevance to the pertinent and 
responsible performance of public functions. 
The Sectoral Fragmentation of support for reform policies remains the most profitable of 
the dominant deficiencies of the culture set in supporting the governmental action. 
The Romanian transition does not lack partial successes, isolated in some sectors of the 
public administration, at local or departmental level. For these it can thank the political 
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 circumstances related to the organizational availability of the parties involved in the government, 
or to the marked psychology of some characters of the transition involved in decision-making 
structures. 
There were “moments of grace” even at the top and these have kept Romania on the list 
of the countries advancing on the Western path.  
This sectoral heroism, obvious and beneficial, is in fact “the exception that proves the 
rule”. On one hand it points out the fragility of the structural devices of reform, and on the other 
hand it illuminates the circumstantial character through which the reform has imposed itself as a 
coordinating axis of the transition. 
Sectoral fragmentation has another drawback, namely that it makes it more difficult to 
harmonize renewals at the national level, even if it does not often entail “fratricidal conflicts” 
between the representatives of reform belonging to different ideological orientations or political 
parties. 
That is why, before approaching the basic topic of national reconciliation, the political 
actors are asked to reconcile the diverse, though genuine, reforming trends. 
Romanian politics still lacks a force able to synthesize these trends, to decrease the 
sources of national disagreement, and to form a national consensus on the major issues.  
 
2.6. “The Fragmentation Effect”, or the Influence of Political Actors on the 
Fragmentation of Decision-Making Processes.  
Although the state’s step by step withdrawal from the economy is one of the defining 
trends of the reform, and marks the separation from the totalitarian regime, the presence of the 
political factors in the decision-making structures is constant and has a decisive influence. 
Moreover, the appearance of political competition, and the explosive development of 
public debate, generates a paradoxical revival of the political agents’ presence in the economic 
and social structures. 
It is not only that the political aspect remains constant, but it is also encouraged to 
proliferate, as the new social-economic opportunities and the new interest groups offer both 
stakes and circumstances that are inherently attractive to the politicians. Moreover, the new 
economic-social structures lack elements of protection, and the autonomy of the civic structures 
and the private sector is still far from being consolidated. 
In these conditions, the adverse reactions in which the association with the political 
factors, the request for their protection and their patronage are much more frequent and comes to 
compensate exactly for their weakness. An incredible dependence on the political factors is 
maintained and makes it possible, for quite a long period of time, for several actors to interfere in 
the most surprising ways. 
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 That is why the political actors’ presence and influence damages the decision-making 
processes most of the time. In its first stages the market economy, free initiative, and local 
autonomy are vast political shows, and consequently they endure a severe fragmentation and 
distortion, mainly at the decision-making level. It is not rare that the logic of the market falls 
under the jurisdiction of political actors, with all the distorting and deviating effects that they 
induce.  
Most often, the political factors’ interference in the logic of the market distorts the 
economic reality, damages competition, corrupts relations and delays the liberalization of the 
labor market.  
This effect of fragmentation and distortion is more deceitful as it does not take place only 
when the political factors are of a leftist orientation. 
The populism of liberal origin, the state property reflexes that can be seen in the behavior 
of some Christian-Democrat politicians, proved to be, during the first ten years of the transition, 
a palpable reality in almost all Eastern European countries. Even the intervention of the 
international financing bodies, behind which there are Western governments whose liberal 
tradition cannot be questioned, often bring to bear foreign trends and circumstances, even though 
they may not hostile to the emerging free markets from the post-communist societies. 
One could draw the conclusion that during the first years of the transition, for these 
emerging markets, and for the new competitive environment, the political element was, 
irrespective of its orientation, an anti-liberal factor.  
The finalization of transition requires not merely the release from the socialist state and 
the domination of the sole party, but moreover release from politics in general.  
From this standpoint, the “top-down reform” is set as a historical trap through which 
Eastern European societies have passed, and in which some remain. This includes Romania.  
The universal character of the reform also provides the political institutions and the 
public administration with unlimited access to the decision-making processes of the emerging 
market economies. One can notice here an unclear and dynamic border, and indeed the 
governance of the reform is a sort of border management, where the “releasing” political forces 
must lose ground to win the battle. That things often take a different course is a  consequence of 
the infamy of the Romanian FPS**, which only the various ministries can overcome. 
Although it seems apparently chaotic, this ambivalent practice of the emancipation of the 
economy and of the civil society through political factors has acquired a certain coherence 
through ten years of faltering reform, systematic postponements and failures. 
The most significant examples of the political factors’ interference in the policies of 
reform follow: 
                                                 
** The State Property Fund - essential body established by the privatization law as an instrument of the state's 
withdrawal from the economy. 
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 2.6.1. Public Information and the Establishment of the Goals of Reform 
The primary activity of the decision-making mechanism is to draft the official agenda for 
governance as an assumed list of priorities, in accordance with the social-economic balance and 
in supporting of the reform policies.  
Identifying major topics on the agenda implies a set of strategic targets defined by the 
governance program in accordance with the way the current reality is perceived and evaluated at 
the institutional level. 
Normally, the strategic goals agreed upon in political arrangements leading up to the 
election -- and which dictate the modus vivandi in the period immediately following the election 
-- help to  determine the nature of official public information and the main goals of governance.  
That is why gathering information, acknowledging facts, classifying the true magnitude 
of trends, and arranging and classifying official information represents a very sensitive field 
which is also very relevant for drafting public policies. 
A highly complex process, one central to the functioning of the modern state, is required 
to formulate of the priorities of government for a given period. 
Public acknowledgment of the factual situation faced in the social and economic 
environment, and of the existing or dormant trends, provides the raw material for determining 
options, decisions and rules.  
That is why this field of governance is one of the most important, with respect to having 
direct access over the levers of powers. 
Those who preside over the most relevant, officially accepted facts also control to a great 
extent both the content of related decisions and the distribution of responsibilities, their 
performance and their resources. 
One could often see during the past ten years that drafting the government agenda was a 
chaotic activity, subject to either momentary constraints from subjective political or social 
pressures, or to the mechanical application of foreign models according to circumstantial 
options. All these have proved to have too little substance in relation to the national interest. 
A legacy of the old authoritarian system also remains, whereby the mystification of truth 
represented an essential method for subordinating the population and consolidating the position 
of the ruling class. Despite democratization, the temptation of “bureaucratic control,” of the 
monopoly on public official information and the liberty to “beautify” facts, continues to distort 
primary data. At the same time, there was little data collection, processing, or specialization, 
particularly as it concerns the news processes, the market economy, the new needs of the labor 
market --  with the profile that the social environment has received meanwhile -- or new 
frustrations and vulnerabilities. Far from being a simple academic enterprise, the study of reality 
acquires a primarily strategic function. As it is, one can hardly contest that the foreigners know 
Romania better than its own administration, and both better than its people. 
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 This handicap has been continuously amplified by the political actors’ excessive concern 
for “image” at both domestic and foreign levels.  
“The state of things” has remained one of Bucharest’s mysteries throughout all these 
years, alongside the mysteries of the revolution, corruption, former Securitate files and 
controversial events of the post-revolutionary period. As in all other cases, running away from 
reality contributes mainly to the amplification of myths. In this regard the control of information 
relating to the economic-social situation represents one of the most serious threats to the national 
security, as it distorts or deviates the decision-making processes from the start. 
The production, administration, and dissemination of public information has not become 
yet an institutional, consistent, systematic or fully accessible practice for the decision makers. 
This situation represents a unique mechanism that generates inertia, misleads efforts and 
initiatives, and maintains an uncertainty that has a severe impact on the politicians’ credibility. 
At the same time, the ambiguity of information within the system allows the production 
and maintenance of non-issues in public debate, opens unexpected opportunities for conservative 
politicians, and leaves Romania as a whole a marginal imitator in regional and global 
competition.  
The conceptualization of facts, trends and social-economic events relating to transition 
represents in fact a primary qualitative resource of those in power. Most often this essential 
function of  the modern state has remained simply an arena of “public fight” among the political 
actors marked by passion, dogma and mean interests.  
“The Little Babylon” from Bucharest excels in the picturesque and irresponsible 
pleasures of issuing simple opinions about an increasingly complicated and precarious reality. In 
the past ten years, too many poets and writers have built public careers out of assigning names to 
the bitter deeds of transition in a country marked by systematic failures. 
Too few studies, reports, data bases, and procedures for institutional communication have 
been drafted and integrated into the decision-making processes. The high level of informational 
risk is one of the most serious consequences of the political actors’ interference in the decision-
making mechanisms.  
2.6.2. Setting Standards in the Economic and Social Fields 
In the conditions of the post-communist transition, reform can be defined as an effort at 
the national level to orient the profitable disorder. Taking into consideration the fact that 
stagnation represents one of the most serious dangers, setting standards in the fields of 
expressing free initiative brings the relation between the assurance of stability and the 
management of unbalances to new levels.  These fields of initiative include community 
autonomy, the diversification of behavioral and communicational patterns, and the amplification 
of exchanges through the stimulation of competition. 
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 At the same time, one can also notice a deep need to produce specific languages to 
describe the new roles, structures, forms of organization, and rules in this rapidly expanding 
social-economic environment. 
It is equally true that, although there is a consensus for rejecting the values and principles 
belonging to the old system, in fact, for an interval of time difficult to set, one can see a constant 
inertia for promoting new behavioral models both at the level of economic activity and in 
everyday life. 
In this field it is a great danger when control of -- or influence over -- the standardization 
mechanisms acquires a “value of exchange”, and represents a high-impact political resource. 
Those who pay the piper will set the tune, mainly the results. 
On the other hand, sociological studies have highlighted, an intrinsic and unavoidable 
tendency for mass-level experimentation in the effort to reform the new social-economic 
environment.  This comes as no surprise, following decades of blind retaliation, disobedience 
and social evasion. 
Disorder represents a tempting sort of “freedom” for a population that has shed the 
constraints of a system whose manipulation defied the limits of tolerance. 
One can pursue normality and efficiency with the premise that transition toward an open 
society should be based on standards that stimulate initiative, profit from new resources, and 
maintain balance during the general change of economic and institutional structures.  
During the first decade of the Romanian transition the majority of political actors have 
succumbed in a partisan way to the temptation of controlling access to standardization activities 
and bodies. Standardization and the normative function have not become a genuinely public 
function at all. 
The discrimination, retaliation, personal ambition, political dogma and cheap 
cosmopolitanism of the current system have raised to new levels things that totalitarian 
communism never had the chance or the intention to do.  
Still far from being a source of balance and preservation through selfless service, the 
post-communist state’s standardization function has often made itself conspicuous through 
partisan selection processes. 
What is equally serious and harmful is the almost unanimous belief that the standards are 
not going to be observed in any way. Consequently they are simple landmarks for an incredibly 
broad variety of practices that follow political motivations as much as the law. 
In this way, the act of standardization has become one of the premises for corruption, the 
underworld economy, the black market of labor, fiscal evasion, selective justice and great 
political scandals. 
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 The failure of institutional politics to cover transition from the viewpoint of standards 
results from compromises accepted at certain of crossroads, from the endorsement of the new 
Constitution to the essential laws of reform. 
The disjunction between the standards of the state and those of the private sector -- 
between exigencies and the public administration’s domestic and foreign behavior -- mark a 
normative space where the initial disorder of change was permanently replaced, not with an 
order of the active normality but with a reality subordinated to the ephemeral political balance 
between two terms of office. 
This is why the act of justice seems to be a failed public hope. This is why the practice of 
the contractual agreements failed to become a predominant mechanism for the achievement of 
economic and social balance. This is why Mafiosi-type behavior extends and consolidates itself 
as a variant of success in the establishment of new interest groups. 
The politicization of standards brought about a legislative instability and has severely 
diminished the performance of the economic structures and the basic communitarian initiative. In 
time, it could consume a considerable part of Romania’s reconstruction and modernization 
effort. 
After ten years of transition an ambiguous political environment, marked by various 
authoritarian trends, finds itself increasingly lacking any authority. 
2.6.3. The Operational Deficit through Procedures of Standards and Policies 
The Romanian reality and the domestic political environment do not miss opportunities 
for historical decisions and spectacular decisional starts in the most varied fields. Political 
programs, social contracts, sectoral agreements, statements of principles, proclamations, 
domestic or international commitments, legislative frameworks and local decisions have 
proliferated within the public sphere and largely cover many public officials’ careers. 
Congresses, reunions, seminars, news conferences, official bulletins, or press releases fill 
the public memory of the Romanian society. “In principle” quite a lot of serious topics were 
approached and set in official documents. 
The functionality of procedures in the new institutional structures remains a significant 
deficiency in public life. The public consequently lacks concrete and accessible means for 
solving problems in economic and social fields.  
During all these years, drafting and mainly supporting procedures in everyday life has 
been the big bluff of the post communist system. It was a systemic deficiency, for the differences 
between the political orientations of the decision-making factors were negligible. 
The politicians of post-communist Romania have held endless debates on the truthfulness 
of facts, and are having fierce fights in endorsing laws, but they cede both physically and 
intellectually when it comes to enacting procedures indispensable to the functioning of public 
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 administration. This activity seems minor when compared to the historical import of the 
television broadcast debate, of the interviews in the written media, or of pathetic gestures. 
The procedural deficiencies impact the new routine of effectively managing the real 
economic-social processes. This process probably disturbs the inclination toward utopia, 
demagogy and formalism of the first waves of public officials. The procedures are in fact the 
touchstone of the programmatic options. 
The institutional procedures involve resources, ways, means, austerity and coherence. 
The institutional procedures assure the finalization, in public action, of the macro-economic 
agreements or of the social agreements. 
That is why they imply normative single systems and not diverging ones, they imply 
institutional mechanisms made up not only of charismatic leaders, but also of efficient and 
responsible executives, they imply institutional coherence in relation to the accepted practices 
both in public and private fields, at central and local levels, at home and abroad.  
It seems a little bit too much to ask of a political system seduced by the daily show of 
sterile confrontation, by the ability to allocate budgets according to emotional fancy. 
Procedural mechanisms are still shockingly poor in Romania. Now they have openly 
become a major source of waste, failure and mutual distrust between authorities and the public. 
Conversely, the public sphere is marked by the continuous flow of derogation from 
institutional norms and practices. The variety, creativity and social energy that fuel 
“institutionalized trickery” in Romania represent the most dynamic, complex field, and most 
probably the one with the most prospects. Quite a few Western experts have assumed the risk of 
coming to Bucharest and have been amazed by the cleverness with which state and private 
organizations have avoided the laws intended to facilitate economic social activities. 
The temptation to interpret this trend a component of the national pride is one of the most 
tragi-comical traps that the Romanians, released from the totalitarian communism, accept and 
establish with an endless energy. 
The severe deficit on the part of the state bodies to fight these practices, does not 
originate, however, in the faults of the national psychology, but rather in the system of privileges 
and opportunities that largely motivate public actors, including interest groups and above all 
politicians. 
It is increasingly obvious that a genuine modernization of Romania, and Romania’s real 
acceptance in the free world, will not take place before the significant extension of modern 
procedures. 
What is currently being ignored is the truth, taken into consideration by the West, that 
procedures lead to benefits superior to the current theft, mean abuse and vain political ambitions. 
2.6.4. Politics - Between Political Addresses and Pragmatic Approaches 
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 The difficulties, mistakes and failures that have marked the preliminary acts of the 
decision-making processes during the past ten years (Public Information, Norms, and 
Procedures) have not only sectoral significance, for they also reveal the limitations of the 
existing political environment. The consequences of these deficiencies are to be found among the 
most influential structures in the field of public policy. 
The formulation of public options is the main window onto the decision-making 
processes at the macro level. 
In the conditions of transition from totalitarian communism to the open society and 
reintegration into the free world, the selection of strategic options is not merely a customary 
constitutional exercise like in societies with an established democracy and a consolidated market 
economy. Official policy is not merely the articulation of the majority’s plans for governance, 
under normal circumstances a simple public service.  
As it has been said previously, the goals of governance during the period of transition are 
much more complex and are inherently contradictory: the management of the crises of the 
remaining structures, the initiation and the consolidation of the new market structures and 
democracy, the maintenance and stimulation of functional balances, the emerging mechanisms of 
free and participatory initiative. 
The historical peculiarity of the decision-making processes in the conditions of transition 
requires that they be established amidst dynamic complexity.  
Even for the most effective governance formulas imaginable, this historical option would 
pose considerable barriers and traps. The constant multiplication of critical thresholds 
perpetuates economic and social tension. This can stimulate public life, but it maintains an 
institutional tension and above all a very severe level of social costs. 
The governments of the transition face an uninterrupted succession of confrontations and 
intense constraints which not even famous bodies of the Western governments would face easily. 
That is why critical analysis risks resorting to simple ethical principles and intellectual utopia, 
leading to ideological nihilism and pessimism. 
Resuming of the devices of positive thinking at the level of analysis is now essential for 
the revival of reform in cases where it has scored systematic failures, and where it has reached 
thresholds of impressive performance. 
The pragmatic and lucid reevaluation of the transition mainly points out three levels for 
the operation of decision-making mechanisms, where the impact of the policies will be greatest. 
Consequently, owing to the power of arguments backed by an extremely rich series of 
contradictory facts, the critical thresholds of public options in the conditions of the transition 
appear. Of course, they are not original in relation to the set patterns, but they present acute 
symptoms because of the historical conditions. 
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 How and on what grounds is the opportunity of engaging some reform policies offered? 
How viable are the packages of solutions? What is the true operational capacity of the official 
policies? 
This matrix of the decision-making processes requests a high degree of coherence in 
design, competence in administration and, of course, material support -- mainly financial and 
technological support, but also public support for the initiation, maintenance and finalization of 
changes. 
After all the problem is not to reinvent the bicycle now, but to use it up a steep and 
curving path.  
The current policies of the Romanian government during the transition offer a series of 
contradictory and surprising cases. After ten years of delay, we can however say that there is 
nothing left to invent that might interfere with reform. The Romanian policy officials have 
proven to have a negative creativity and a remarkable vitality. 
The Romanian leader is clever and industrious. The problem for Romania is that when 
the Romanian leaders were clever they were not industrious, and when they were industrious 
they were terribly naive. 
The quantity of irrational arguments delivered to the decision-making bodies during the 
first years of the transition have been aggressive, widespread and directly damaging. The only 
hope is that this pattern has not yet become routine. 
There is an impressive national collection of blunders -- due to errors of appreciation, 
unhappy choices of the moment, preferences for tedious ways and blind alleys, uninspired 
planning for the succession of actions, self-contradictory support before the public or foreign 
partners -- which poses major difficulty to those who seek to record them in the media or in data 
bases.  
What are the main causes of this Romanian instinct for drafting supporting risky policies 
in the first decade of the transition? 
To save time in our analysis, we shall mark several components of the faulty mechanisms 
for drafting and implementing policies which has dominated the public life. 
In setting the grounds for the opportunities of policies and orientations of effective 
programs, one could notice an attitude, already considered to be an institutional practice, of 
ignoring the specific references of some reform policies.  
The principles of the market economy were avoided, alongside the rigors of the private 
initiative and of competition.  
The expectations and needs of the performing companies have been systematically upset, 
irrespective of the government’s political stripe.  
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 At the same time, they have sacrificed the public’s expectations of new behavioral 
consumption patterns, professional commitment and mobility on the labor market.  
The negative signs of the true economy, mainly those referring to the devastating effects 
of keeping the “black holes” inherited from the socialist economy, have been ignored until the 
eleventh hour. In Romania, owing to the megalomaniacal policies of the former Ceausescu 
dictatorship, they have reached the climax of economic pathological manifestation. 
Ambiguous nationalism remained constant in relation to the foreign investors, among 
whom were chosen only those who met the pray policies, based on corruption, mean and 
circumstantial benefits, through a selection process based on preferences and obscure 
compatibilities.The system of solutions referring to the access to resources is an important 
component of the internal logic of formulating policies, when these resources are indispensable 
to the execution of the policies in a troubled economic space, limited by constraints and with a 
reduced capacity for regeneration. “The Exceptional Romanian Cases” also score in this very 
sensitive field a performance that is difficult to equal. The high level, variety of forms and legal 
creativity of wasted spending of the national income, during a severely and increasingly 
depressed economy increasingly isolated in international exchanges, would make the managers 
of a prosperous economy green with envy! Of course, considering they are genuinely concerned 
with the matter... 
To compensate for it, the Romanian bureaucracy, inspired by ambitious visionaries, has 
in its wisdom designed and backed both in Parliament and before the Romanian public policies 
that offer completely spectacular promises but lack all interest in the existence of accessible 
resources. Constantly, both the Parliament dominated by an obedient majority and the public end 
up believing it.  
Resuming parliamentarian cycles through free elections has constantly assured these 
beliefs and it is not that clear yet where this national tragic comedy is going to end.  
Prospective financial collapse has moderated this economic kitsch in 1999, and has 
sensibly reduced the “playing room” of the current national utopia. Is a “Bulgarian crisis” indeed 
necessary, to purge  the decision-making mechanisms of the system of institutional waste ? 
Of course, it would be a new paradox if policies drafted without regard for the referential 
that is essential to the reform, inspired instead by devastating resource allocations, would in fact 
benefit operations backed by the market economy and modernization criteria! 
However, the management of policies has much more modest ambitions. The discipline 
of government represents an uninteresting peculiarity for the politicians of the transition and has 
no reason to become an obsession of the departmental bureaucrats.  
Results show a remarkable performance limited to some policies’ sectoral 
implementation, owing to the hazardous combination of certain political trends and some 
ephemeral opportunities.  
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 The trends of unfair competition among policies, depending on the ministry leaders’ 
political color, of the games of interests, of facts, of corruption or of the whimsical goodwill of 
some circumstantial foreign partners were predominant. 
A lack of coherence in backing the policies of reform represents the rule of transition in 
Romania. 
The compromise of minimal resistance to the solutions effectively implemented, the 
shifting of resources toward other unplanned goals or simply their tacit abandonment, represent 
the set model of functionality. A complicity that verges on national consensus makes the system 
accept repeated failures as standard. 
For Romanian leaders, the horror of finalizing policies exceeds even the fear of death. 
2.6.5. Oscillation and Stagnation in the Orientation of Strategic Processes  
Designing, assuming and managing policies is not a highly traditional activity in itself, 
not even in primitive societies. Where it takes place, this very complex action aims at backing or 
at least influencing some structural processes with strategic value. 
In the conditions of transition toward a market economy and democratization the political 
actors in competition pursue this end militantly, for this is the very “core of the reform”. 
The unavoidable balance of the first ten years of painful reform in Romania presents us 
with a chaotic landscape, difficult to synthesize but perhaps able to teach us lessons. 
If the reform failed to be more than a slogan and an illusory source of constitutional 
legitimacy for this part of the post-communist Europe, then a contradictory experience in the 
public sphere offers us interesting facts that seem incompatible with the effective availability and 
capacity of political actors, namely those involved in the electoral competition for the year 2000. 
The reform should involve the management or at least the influence of the processes 
entailing economic, social and political changes, through an institutionalized strategic project, 
supported at the national level through consensus and unified efforts for change at political, 
administrative and communitarian levels. 
An embarrassingly exigent definition for Romania’s case, but anyway a modest 
instrument of analysis for the relevance of processes and trends that could be noticed during the 
first decade of the transition. 
If we come back to reality, we must consider some structural differences that had 
substantial consequences on the process of transition.  
First of all, we must recognize an unavoidable differentiation, owing to the peculiarity of 
the sub-systems, between the relatively dynamic evolution of the political environment, the 
diversification until fragmentation and polarization of the structures, and the much slower and 
non-productive evolution of the new economic structures based on the role and practices of the 
market economy. 
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 These differences and multiple tensions have manifested themselves even in the happiest 
cases, many in small-size countries that are located nearer to the West. 
In Romania, the effects of these differences have increased the complexity of the 
transition in a natural way, and they have favored the political actors’ excessive influence in the 
intimate dynamics of processes. 
Romania was not close enough to the area of influence of the victorious West during the 
past century’s war between historical blocks, nor was it dynamic enough to make room through 
its own efforts.   
If we limit ourselves to interest and effective internal capacity, we must take into 
consideration the main institutional deficiencies that have hindered the depth and rhythm of 
reform, and have above all distorted its strategic orientation: 
The new political environment’s reduced capacity to formulate and support national 
consensus has remained a constant deficiency of the first decade. Conversely, without any 
exception, whenever one of the major topics of the reform has imposed itself in the forefront of 
public debate, this was turned into a source of disagreement, delayed the start of institutional 
action, amplified confusion and thus encouraged the conservative trends and the population’s 
distrust. 
The virus of public discontent has marked, and often not in the immediate beginning, the 
relations between those in office and the opposition. The diverging opinions and the discordance 
in assuming responsibilities have quite often undermined internal party relations and alliances  
that have taken office in turn. 
This historical peculiarity of the post-communist systems, being democratic and efficient 
only in minor topics, had an overwhelming presence in Romania after Ceausescu’s regime. 
The new institutional system has often proved to be mainly inefficient when it used 
democracy, and proved to be non-democratic when it succeeded, in the eleventh hour, to honor 
the exigencies of efficient management. It is not by chance that the majority of major decisions 
relating to the orientation of strategic processes were made under the pressure, with the 
assistance of and substantial interference from foreign actors, at the decision-making level. The 
tradition of “the export of revolution” that made history during the epoch of Soviet communism 
finds now a strange echo in a tradition toward the free world. It seems easier to unite the 
Romanians, starting from the leaders to the ordinary people, around initiatives from abroad than 
to build a substantial internal consensus. 
The capacity to build an internal consensus represents the essential criterion of the 
national elite. The new Romanian political class’ temptation for partisan supremacy, maniacal 
contestation and cheap fame has constantly dominated the efforts at compromise, solidarity, 
pragmatism and positive thinking. 
The division into political groups has constantly been a fault of the Marxist-Leninist 
communism, carefully hidden through the apparatus’ retaliation structures. The “internal blind 
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 fight” reflex can still be noticed in the behavior of politicians, placing the real task of mobilizing 
resources and finding answers for the challenges of the transitions at a secondary level. 
Unfortunately, even the anti-Communist transition fails to offer too many examples of national 
consensus, and from this standpoint the representatives of the “historical parties” have excelled 
in the games of internal intrigue. Wisdom failed to follow the old age and the recent tradition 
failed to become a chance for public common sense, authority and pragmatism. 
The predominance of change through crisis, to the detriment of institution-building, has 
been the defining characteristic of the Romanian transition process. 
However, when they still took place, the essential changes in legislation, at the 
institutional level or in the economic structures, did so in the last minute, under the pressure of 
circumstances, after exhausting internal confrontation, with half measures, or they included 
ambiguous things that have minimized efficacy.  
The balance of changes through convulsive processes has made the cost of changes 
increase artificially and has reduced or delayed their benefits. 
The transition “pushed from the back”, owing to the fear of economic collapse or under 
the increasingly impatient pressure of foreign partners, is the memory Romania takes to the 
protocol photo taken on the occasion of the ten-year anniversary from the fall of the 
communism. 
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to deny the growing chorus from the West 
claiming that Romanians sought to rid themselves of  communists but not socialism. 
The consequence of this political and popular ambiguity is the maintenance of a high 
potential for instability, inefficiency and uncertainty.  
Of course, experience shows the difficulty of rebuilding in an area constantly subjected to 
seismic movements. 
The consistency and coherence of strategic processes are also deeply marked by the 
increased discordance among official policies. 
It is a common fact that if something has been finally decided at the official level 
(Presidential body, Romanian Parliament, Government, or some distant city hall), most certainly 
that thing will be implemented in a different, delayed and often a completely opposed manner to 
the one in which it was planned. 
There is an individual and collective energy of unrealized scope, a terribly inventive, 
fascinating and spontaneous combination of the circumstances that make the very important 
public acts become simple sheets of paper. Deviation from set goals, avoidance of efficiency and 
consistency in administrative confusion are the most popular national sports. 
To show these discrepancies at the level of processes makes the Romanian transition 
become a different story. Even the most experienced foreign experts in country risk analysis 
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 have nervous breakdowns after a short period of time keeping the Romanian file updated and 
making short- and medium-term forecasts.  
It is most certainly for the future generations to find out how big are the costs of this 
vocation for the unpredictable. 
The system and process costs obviously set the price for modernization in post-
communist Europe. This has meanwhile become a very dangerous conclusion, which the foreign 
investors and the Western governments have no reason to ignore. 
However, what expresses best the Romanian political class’ bankrupt mentality is their 
claim, despite their modest capacity to master, support, and orient the strategic processes, to be 
“included on the list” alongside neighboring, performing countries on grounds of personal 
friendship, Latin origin, or on behalf of a geographical strategic location marked by an assumed 
Messianism. 
There is not such a thing as charity in history, and fierce regional and global competition 
makes attempts to petition foreign goodwill ridiculous. 
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 3.  2000 - 2004 Perspectives 
3.1. The Most Menacing Possibilities 
The main conclusion of this retrospective critical analysis on the dysfunctional relations 
between the performance of the internal political environment and the efficiency of the policies 
of reform does not concern the past. The general dissatisfaction with the contradictory and 
predominantly negative performance of the Romanian institutional system, and with its social 
costs, does not have to remain a merely moralizing debate. 
The main topic that this analysis points out is that the next decade may hold deep and 
extreme detriment for Romanian society, which existing means and resources will have 
increasing difficulty to address. 
That is why the identification of risks --  even just a hypothetical outline of the main 
vulnerabilities --  of negative evolutions that might emerge from the current situation, combined 
with the inherent challenges of the next decade, could offer the means to diminish the costs of 
repeating and accumulating this country’s serious dysfunction. 
Besides the temptation for prophecy, which has become a hobby at the end of the 
millennium, the evaluation negative potential from the historic perspective is an essential area 
not only for research, but also for public debate. Moreover, skilled expertise is asked to clarify 
the possible developments as a tool for political planning at the macro level. Of course, here we 
deal with a complex enterprise. The main difficulties arise from the multiple variables that have 
to be combined from trends of mere “historical routine” and possible new developments. The 
influences of a regional space deeply transformed into an increasingly dynamic environment will 
most certainly have an important role. 
That is why, for the economy of the present study, topics for thought are to be presented 
more, alongside working hypotheses. The explicit goal is to consolidate interest for using the 
understanding of the near future in designing and drafting strategic orientations and options. 
Several groups of factors and trends are taken into consideration in identifying these 
topics for thought related to the most menacing developments: 
The effects of the previous faults have reached a critical mass due to the counter-
productivity of the institutional system and the dynamics of previous policies. 
These faults mainly refer to the costs of the systematic failures suffered during the first 
ten years of transition. At the structural level they have generated durable changes, costs 
extended in time, and have entailed distortions that persist and combine themselves in an 
uncomfortable reality. The new internal differences, the degradation of human and economic 
potential, the aggravation of dysfunctional situations in the productive or administrative 
mechanisms have their consequences in the near future. 
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 Of course, things would be much simpler if the economic-social reality “would forget” 
with the same ease with which politicians and institutional actors forget. Nevertheless, the reality 
of memory is implacable. 
Reproduction and even diversification of dysfunction in the internal political field, in the 
mechanisms for drafting and finalizing policies.  
There are no favoring conditions or new elements in the evolution of the political factors 
that might lead to the conclusion that in the following interval of time (2000-2004) the dynamics 
of politics will emancipate itself from the patterns that were dominant in the first decade of 
transition. Even if recent mistakes are not compounded with further types of errors and 
dysfunction, the momentum of present negative developments remains assured in the future too. 
A highly unpredictable element results from the combination of the new challenges of the 
period -- which have somehow come from the future -- the complexity of the new situation, and 
the new circumstances and actors that follow from regional and global developments. These 
challenges could offer, after the first ten years of grace, a change in the relation between 
opportunities and constraints posed by international and domestic dynamics. 
The combination of these major sources of the country’s risks, with a medium-term 
action, highlights significant working hypotheses that are relevant for a systematic analysis and 
for concern at political and institutional levels. 
3.1.1. The decline of the authority of the national unified state represents one of the 
most dangerous developments that accompany the transition of the post-communist countries. At 
first sight, it corresponds to some positive trends connected to administrative decentralization 
and the gradual elimination of the state property system in the economy. Without having assured 
these qualitative changes of the institutional system, the dysfunctional developments and the 
failure enact changes favor a continuous dissolution of the state. It is the effect of stagnation, 
modernization, the wear and tear endured by a political life that is both prolix and ineffective.  
The public’s decreased trust in the state bodies represents evidence of this trend.  
The expansion of corruption and the influence of obscure mechanisms on the decision-
making processes seem to be a difficult trend to keep under control in the near future.  
Under these circumstances, what are the limit’s of the state’s ability to mobilize the 
public, to find solutions to some strategically important matters and to overcome some confused 
moments? 
3.1.2. The accentuation of discordance between the political forces in competition and 
between the fundamental state bodies. 
The politicians’, leaders’ and the organizations’ preference for conflict to the detriment 
of productive alliances and stable majority coalitions is obvious. A very serious question remains 
about the internal political forces’ capacity to achieve and support a national consensus.  
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 The past years’ experience has proved the formal character of the political alliances and 
the modest efficiency of the cooperation within the governing coalitions. These have ensured a 
minimum stability. Nevertheless, an increasingly obvious critical threshold can be noticed 
between the compromises for stability and the costs emerging from the extended postponement 
of the reforms. The 2000 elections are already marked by the specter of deadlock in remaking a 
majority coalition, indispensable for governance.  
3.1.3. The bankruptcy of public management could become a much more direct threat to 
the population. The state bodies’ increasingly reduced capacity to assure public services, to 
selectively compensate for the social costs of the transition, should be interpreted as a symptom 
of structural decline.  
It becomes increasingly obvious that this is not only about budgets, but also about a more 
important difference between the structure of the old and inert public mechanisms and the 
capacity to answer to an increasingly frustrated and confused society. The unbalance between the 
active population and the protected one, between social income and expenses, cannot remain 
without consequences.  
3.1.4. The accentuation of social fragmentation and polarization. The post-communist 
transition is characterized by inter-dependence between the agony of the real economy and the 
fall of communist egalitarianism, state-property paternalism and social protection. 
In its ideal formulation, the economic reform accepts the social costs of transition as a 
group of temporary differences and unbalances that can be compensated for and oriented toward 
a structure where the new middle class will be able to assure the balance between a minority that 
concentrates the economic power according to the market rules and relatively restricted 
categories, discouraged mainly by the incapacity to face competition and change.  
This status requires several antecedents that are far from being achieved in the Romanian 
transition: 
The restructuring of industry is going to be achieved in an orderly, consistent manner, at 
the same as a wide process of professional training for new, profitable, expanding sectors. The 
restructuring process took place slowly, in a fragmented way, and the population made 
redundant was either abandoned in the unemployment processes or it was directed toward even 
less productive sectors.  
The redistribution of the benefits of transition is going to take place through the revival 
of productive activities, investments, technological renewal and stimulation of creativity. The 
redistribution was done through promotion of new privileges or was strongly distorted by 
economic-financial crime, corruption, black market of the labor force.  
Personal and collective relations will be rebuilt according to new behavioral values and 
patterns. Mercantile trends, aggressive heroism, community conflicts, proliferation of obscure 
organizational structures, suspicion and violence dominated the reconstitution of the social 
relations. 
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 The social perspective will be dominated in content, ways and means by the Western 
model of society, accessible either at the individual level, or through the Euro-Atlantic 
integration. Nostalgia for the near past (communist) or for the farther past (inter-war) tend to 
dominate the population’s expectancies.  
Even if we resume ourselves only to these components of the social restructuring process, 
one can predict the coming of a period of time when the inertia of the economic processes 
extends into not only the difficulties in the everyday life, but also communitarian disaggregation, 
distorting inter-personal internal psychological relations. 
3.1.5. The amplification of political and social confusion in fact reflects the increasingly 
obvious trends in social relations and subjective processes. Aside from the nostalgic trends or the 
increasing reticence toward the West, brought about mainly by the evolution of the economy, a 
series of individual and collective trends exert greatest influence over communitarian and 
political behavior. 
Proliferation of manipulation through media, owing to the preference for sensational, 
scandalous news, and the commercial finalization of messages, by speculating fears, evasion, 
and the public’s low level of information and understanding. 
Degradation of manners and of lifestyles, at the same time that  familial and 
communitarian structures decline. 
Decrease of public interest for political and electoral involvement. 
The main risks emerging from the accentuation of this trend are the diminution of public 
support for reform and modernization, the decreasing legitimacy of democratic institutions, and 
the debilitated capacity to mobilize the nation and communities during times of crisis.  
3.1.6. Diversification and sharpening of social relations. Social instability has been a 
constant factor of the Romanian transition. If, during the first years, the social reactions mainly 
originated from the difficulties of economic and institutional adjustment, in the years to come 
they will originate more from the failure of reform. The proliferation of poverty, social 
polarization, increased differences between various areas, the lack of economic perspectives and 
so forth may fuel another wave of social reactions and protests. The obvious decline of the trade 
union movement, the politicization of some of its segments, and the persistence of some inter-
ethnic tensions will favor the sharpening of the new reactions. The social anarchy will be 
magnified by forms of extremist organizational structures, and it might take to violence. 
Even if we take them separately, these trends often seem to be reactions on behalf of a 
minority or even deviations from generally accepted standards, and their manifestation 
represents obvious signals of failure. They may be reactions to the institutions’ current inability 
to manage the new diversity, or they may evidence the inability to incorporate explicitly hostile 
trends into the nation and the rule of law. 
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 The appearance of some nuclei of community violence, especially in disadvantaged 
areas, is increasingly obvious; they will be more evident if Romania continues exposing itself to 
the influences of an unstable and unpredictable region. 
The erosion of structural cohesion in post-communist society may have deep impact on 
the failure or delay of modernization. 
3.1.7. The proliferation of centrifugal trends in relation to the central government, and 
with the other cohesion factors at the national level, represents a contradictory and challenging 
development. 
The mission of reform and democratization consists in, among others, the historical 
defeat of the single-party political system, the state-property management of the economy, the 
domination of a sole and retaliated source of public communication, and a system of beliefs and 
behavioral patterns that are both restrictive and oppressive. The delay of reform has 
consequences greater than underdeveloped pluralism, competition, initiative and debate.  
A whole series of harmful trends, emerging from the pseudo-development that has taken 
place during the past ten years, replace the old system with a substitute of decentralization: with 
anarchy, nihilistic contestation, social evasion, obscure structures based on despising attitudes 
toward the law, organized crime, political extremism and amateurism, religious experiments, and 
so forth.  
These centrifugal trends express, in a contradictory way, both frustrations inherent to the 
transition process and eccentric evolutions of the social dynamic. To a certain extent one can 
notice the effect of international imitation, along with the release of energies and expectations 
suppressed under the neo-Stalinist dictatorship. 
If the general movement is towards stagnation, and Romanian society’s overall 
competitiveness will remain in a deficit, these centrifugal trends will unavoidably become major 
sources of risk, with a direct effect on internal stability and the state’s integrity.  
3.1.8. Declining foreign influence over the transition represents a major risk to the 
mechanisms for the management of transition, and also in assuring the balances for the 
protection of the national security, sovereignty and independence. The established difficulties in 
achieving economic activity and of social balance represent a first component of this risk. On the 
other hand, leaving Romania in the “gray area” of the former communist block countries, in a 
permanent expectation of some favorable decisions at continental and global level, already 
reflects a very dangerous dependence, especially if we take into consideration serious or 
extended periods of instability. The gradual decline of the competitiveness of the internal 
economic-social activities, in relation to regional or global performance, remains in fact the main 
medium-term cause of the unbalances between internal and foreign factors.  
Aside from temporary patriotic reactions, it has become obvious that task of assuring 
sovereignty are becoming increasingly complex, and is best assured through modernization 
oriented towards the global future. 
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 3.1.9. Romania’s marginalization and isolation represents an established trend for those 
who are familiar with the dynamics of development and performance on the European and global 
markets. This began in the “golden age” of the Ceausescu’s dictatorship. The institutional 
continuation of this trend during transition significantly complicates matters. This fact suggests 
that the risk sources are much more complex, and that the new configuration of the internal 
political environment are unable to meet the foreign requests, to keep pace with the regional and 
global dynamics, to produce arguments able to revive strategic interest in incorporating Romania 
in the new power structures. After ten years of transition, the post-communist societies have 
already been divided into accepted countries, those with an uncertain future, and those with no 
future at all.  
3.1.10. Increased pressure from hostile foreign elements. This development might be 
mainly the result of Romania’s increased vulnerability in the circumstances of general economic 
decline, social-political instability and modest level of foreign alliances. 
Romania’s poor progress in regional competition does not entail only negative 
consequences for the population’s everyday life, but it unavoidably places it on the list of 
vulnerable countries, easy to access and profitable for a very wide range of hostile actors that 
operate at global level. Paranoia is the worst response. On the other hand, the complexity of the 
reaction to this risk requires a systematic approach at the state level that can exceed Romania’s 
current capabilities. 
 
3.2. Minimal Recommendations for the Therapy of Politics  
The focus on the ambivalence of the political factors in the governance of the first ten 
years of transition, the identification of the distorting influences on the decision-making 
mechanisms, and mainly on changes, points out some future options: 
• Fatalistic acceptance of the factual situation and the continuation of the current 
practices and evolutions with a view to an unclear future or to increasingly serious 
crises; 
• Management of the accumulated negative consequences through the mitigation of 
costs, accepting that the transition will be resolved through “spontaneous reform”, the 
underworld economy, and the underworld labor market. One could even argue that, 
from traditional perspectives, such an evolution would in fact be more appropriate to 
the “Romanian people’s psychology”, “their Balkan nature”, and to the regional geo-
political configuration;  
• Revival of reform as a strategic process by shifting the focus public activity from the 
predominance of politics and political competition toward the management of public 
affairs according the market economy and the representation of communitarian 
interests. 
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 It is not difficult to notice that, judging from the past ten years’ activity, the first two 
options have the highest chances of support and implementation. As a matter of fact there is a 
dominant political culture, fully designed and widely spread among the political class and the 
majority of the population. All the new democracy has to do is express it, through free elections, 
“changing the change”, and so forth.  
The third variant risks being reduced to pontification or overly-technical approaches, 
which might produce unrealistic or unpopular solutions. However, to the extent to which we can 
consider the past ten years’ experience as a resource, improving the situation from a critical and 
pragmatic perspective suggests several discontinuity thresholds that describe the role of the 
internal political environment in the management. 
3.2.1. Simplification of the institutional system both in relation to the number of 
political parties and fractions, and the proliferation of the state bureaucracy, mainly at central 
level. 
Such a change would reduce the exaggerated costs of the public administration, but 
would mainly assure a better concentration of quality human resources in a more well-defined 
decision-making nucleus. 
3.2.2. Consolidation of organizational competence. The decantation of experience, in 
particular the access to domestic and foreign networks of expertise and consultancy, can become 
accessible resources to the decision-making bodies. These would replace the current preference 
for rhetorical debate, in apparently democratic structures hampered by incompetence and 
ambition. 
3.2.3. Changing the relations between charismatic domination and the institutional 
mechanisms. This would make it possible to overcome the authority crisis of the “first wave” 
leaders and it would favor the extension of the influence of the project management groups. The 
subjectivism, the new authoritarian trends, and above all the uninterrupted series of “symbolic 
conflicts” between leaders would leave room for the competition centered on results.  
3.2.4. Moving the focus of political action to the field. The acknowledgment and 
assertion of Romania’s new economic-social diversity after ten years of transition begs the 
consolidation of some local and community networks both in political association and in 
managing public affairs. Assistance granted to local initiatives can become a primary factor in 
the consolidation of governance, or of the political actors’ competitiveness. 
3.2.5. Rejuvenation of political leaders alongside changing selection criteria, and 
promotion within internal hierarchies starting from the performance level, competitiveness, and 
audience. This would entail an increase in the degree of representation exercised by political 
organizations, starting with the acknowledgment of the population’s genuine expectations, of 
new needs, life styles, ways of address, and systems to find solutions in the public sphere. 
3.2.6. Clarification of the relations between government and interest groups and 
political lobbies. The judicial settlement of these relations would limit the corruption 
phenomena, thus releasing the decision-making mechanisms from the excessive pressure of some 
 63
 circumstantial, obscure interests. This will require endorsement of clear and transparent 
procedures and consolidation of public control over the financing of the political organizations. 
The repeated failures in the fight against corruption over the past years show the limitations of 
judicial means and public debate.  
3.2.7. Observance of and integration in the new institutional environment. The 
finalization, in broad terms, of the institutional reconstruction of Romanian democracy 
emphasizes the rapid movement from endorsement, to organization, to dissemination, to strict 
commitment to the new roles and responsibilities as an everyday practice. Less spectacular than 
the proclamation of the new Constitution is to observe it as an expression of normality. 
However, it is exactly its effective enforcement in the confrontation with concrete and complex 
situations that gives value and relevance to the institutional background. From the separation of 
powers to the relations between local and central power, or between political forces in office and 
those from the opposition, between authorities and public opinion, or between majority and 
ethnic minorities, the enforcement of the Constitution becomes in fact a field for modernization. 
Thus, what is good for the country, becomes also good for the political actors. 
3.2.8. Modernization of public administration as an institutional mechanism for drafting 
and finalizing policies. The experience gained in the first ten years has pointed out some relevant 
aspects:  
• The politicization of the administration, both at the central and the local levels, is not 
productive, discourages making one’s competence and performance conspicuous, 
dramatically decreases the interest in serving the public, and encourages corruption;  
• In the absence of a flexible and economic procedural system, even the most advanced 
stipulations end in formalism and even favor abuses, systematic infringements of the 
law and even disorder; 
• Public control is irreplaceable and its consolidation will favor not only the citizens as 
beneficiaries, but also those representatives of the administration that are interested in 
the performance of their duties. 
3.2.9. Amplification of the political dialogue and improving the cooperation 
mechanisms. The dynamics of the domestic political environment has based itself, during the 
past ten years, on mutual incriminations and accusations, on diversions, aggressiveness and 
mutual annihilation. In Romanian politics, it was not enough to succeed, others must lose. 
However, this defeated public interest as well.  
A substantiated competition for the people’s benefit could replace the fight for survival. 
The mutual culpability has centered the political life on the relations between politicians. A 
concrete representation of the communities’ interest would favor negotiation and compromise, 
based on the complementary factors between identities, doctrines, and political platforms. At the 
same time, they would assure a higher degree of flexibility and stability for the political 
alliances. The movement of political discourse from general principles and goals to the means, 
resources and alternative solutions for Romania’s problems could play a major role. 
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 3.2.10. The clarification of the major topics for a consistent National Agenda, free from 
parasitic or marginal topics and structured according to strategic priorities. The acknowledgment 
of the structural challenges for the near future could become the premise for negotiating the 
national consensus in the key fields of modernization. This would assure the cohesion and 
consistency of the public effort in drafting and maintaining medium- and long-term policies. 
Taking into consideration Romania’s current situation, the achievement of the national 
consensus on medium-term priorities represents an essential criterion of relevance for the 
existing political class. 
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